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HOW BOTH THE EU AND THE U.S. ARE “STRICTER” THAN
EACH OTHER FOR THE PRIVACY OF GOVERNMENT
REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION
Peter Swire*
DeBrae Kennedy-Mayo**
Law enforcement access to personal data presents a paradox at the heart of
debates between the European Union (EU) and the United States about privacy
protections. On the one hand, the comprehensive privacy regime in the EU
contains many requirements that do not apply in the United States—the EU is
“stricter” than the United States in applying requirements that do not exist in the
latter. On the other hand, the United States also sets requirements that do not
exist in the EU, such as the Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant be
signed by a judge upon a finding of probable cause. Thus, both are stricter in
important ways when setting standards for law enforcement access to personal
data. The fact that both sides are stricter in significant respects is important to
two distinct topics: how to reform the system of Mutual Legal Assistance
(MLA), and whether the United States provides “adequate” protection for
personal data under EU law, and thus is an appropriate destination for data flows
from the EU.
The relative strictness of standards for law enforcement access is central to
understanding current obstacles to reforming the MLA system, the mechanism
for sharing law enforcement evidence held in one country for use in criminal
investigations in a different country. Our research team has been writing a series
of articles about MLA reform.1 The topic has become increasingly important in

* Peter Swire is the Huang Professor of Law and Ethics at the Georgia Institute of Technology’s Scheller
College of Business, and Senior Counsel at Alston & Bird, LLP. For comments on earlier versions of this work,
the authors thank Deven Desai, Daniel Felz, James Harvey, Justin Hemmings, Amie Stepanovich, Suzanne
Vergnolle, and Jesse Woo. This article is current as of November 27, 2016.
** DeBrae Kennedy-Mayo is a research associate faculty member at the Georgia Institute of Technology’s
Scheller College of Business. J.D. Emory Law School.
1 Peter Swire, Justin D. Hemmings & Suzanne Vergnolle, A Mutual Legal Assistance Case Study: The
United States and France, WIS. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2017); Peter Swire & Justin D. Hemmings, Mutual
Legal Assistance in an Era of Globalized Communications: The Analogy to the Visa Waiver Program, N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 3) [hereinafter Swire & Hemmings, Mutual Legal
Assistance], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2728478; Peter Swire & Justin Hemmings,
Stakeholders in Reform of the Global System for Mutual Legal Assistance (Georgia Tech. Scheller College of
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recent years—globalized communications mean that e-mails, social network
data, and other evidence for criminal investigations are often held in a different
country. In the course of studying obstacles to effective reform, we have come
to believe that the fact that both the EU and the United States provide stricter
privacy protections is salient but little understood—each side is reluctant to
compromise on a new approach to the extent that there would be a weakening
of some specific safeguards that currently exist in their respective jurisdictions.
We hope that a fuller understanding of the relative strictness of both sides will
enable a more fruitful discussion of possible paths to MLA reform.
The relative strictness of both the EU and the United States is also important
to a second topic, the current litigation and debates about whether the United
States provides “adequate” protection of privacy, and thus is a lawful destination
for flows of personal data from the EU.2 Under the EU Data Protection
Directive, which went into effect in 1998,3 transfers of personal data from EU
Member States to other countries, such as the United States, are generally
permitted only if the recipient jurisdiction has “adequate” protections.4 From its
negotiation in 2000 until 2015, a major legal basis for such transfers was the
EU/U.S. Safe Harbor, under which participating companies could lawfully send
personal data to the United States.5 In 2015, the European Court of Justice struck
down the Safe Harbor for lacking adequacy in Schrems v. Data Protection
Commissioner.6 A related transfer mechanism, the standard contract clause, is
now facing a similar legal challenge in Ireland, and the Irish Data Protection
Commissioner has preliminarily found the challenge to be “well founded.”7 In
Business, Working Paper No. 2015-32, 2015) [hereinafter Swire & Hemmings, Stakeholders in Reform],
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2696163.
2 See, e.g., Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. I-627.
3 European Commission, Analysis and Impact Study on the Implementation of Directive EC 95/46 in
Member States, at 1, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/lawreport/consultation/technical-annex_
en.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2016).
4 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Oct. 1995 on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 25, 26,
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 33.
5 Mark Scott, Data Transfer Pact Between U.S. and Europe Is Ruled Invalid, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/technology/european-union-us-data-collection.html; see also Commission
Decision Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the
Protection Provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by
the US Department of Commerce, No. 2000/520, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7, 10.
6 Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. at 1.
7 At the time of this writing, the Schrems case is before the Irish High Court. Swire has been engaged as
an independent expert in the case, by Facebook, to discuss, among other things, the U.S. surveillance and privacy
law issues. Under Irish court rules, Swire is required to provide his independent opinion, and not testify as an
advocate for the party that selected him. Rule 57 of the Rules of Procedure of the Superior Courts of Ireland:
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addition, the EU has recently approved two instruments that will go into full
effect in 2018 and strengthen existing privacy protections: the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR),8 which applies predominantly to private-sector
processing of personal information, and a new Police and Criminal Justice
Directive that governs law enforcement access to personal data.9 Both the GDPR
and law enforcement directive have similar “adequacy” requirements for
transfers of personal data.10 An accurate assessment of the adequacy of U.S. law
enforcement access to information is thus vital to multiple aspects of current EU
data protection law.
Part I of this Article provides background for both MLA reform and the
current adequacy debates. Part II highlights ways that the EU’s comprehensive
data protection regime creates privacy protections, including for law
enforcement access, that are stricter than those applied to the United States. Part
III highlights ways the United States has stricter rules governing law
enforcement and other government access to information. We introduce the term
“plus factors” as a way to highlight how specific provisions of U.S. law and
practice provide greater protection than the EU approach. Some of these plus
factors are structural, such as the assurances of lawfulness provided by over two
centuries of the U.S. independent judiciary and operation of a written
constitution of checks and balances. Other plus factors are more specific, such
as the probable cause standard and specific provisions of statutes, such as the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), which provide higher
standards for access to some categories of information than is required in the
EU. Part IV focuses on the implications for MLA reform. Based on our study of
both the EU and U.S. systems, we believe there are generally effective rule-oflaw protections against excessive law enforcement surveillance in both the U.S.
“(1) It is the duty of an expert to assist the Court as to matters within his or her field of expertise. This duty
overrides any obligation to any party paying the fee of the expert.” Rules of the Superior Courts (Conduct of
Trials) 2016, SI 254/2016 (Ir.) r. 57(a).
8 Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection
of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1; Reform of EU Data Protection Rules, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2016).
9 Directive 2016/680, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection
of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes
of the Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal
Penalties, and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA,
2016 O.J. (L 119) 89.
10 Regulation 2016/679, supra note 8, art. 45, at 61 (“A transfer of personal data to a third country . . . may
take place where . . . the international organisation in question ensures an adequate level of protection.”); id. at
19–20 (“The third country should offer guarantees ensuring an adequate level of protection . . . .”).
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and EU Member States. We therefore conclude that these generally effective
safeguards provide a promising basis for MLA reform, even where details of the
systems differ and specific safeguards on one side do not have precise
counterparts on the other.
I. BACKGROUND ON MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE REFORM AND THE
CURRENT ADEQUACY DEBATES
The first section of this Part describes our ongoing research project into MLA
reform and explains the distinctive task of this Article in relation to our previous
work. It also describes the new urgency of MLA reform, in light of the Second
Circuit’s 2016 decision in Microsoft v. United States (Microsoft Ireland),11 and
the 2016 announcement of proposed legislation to reform the MLA process
between the United States and United Kingdom. The second section then
provides background on current data protection controversies between the EU
and the United States both for new EU legal instruments and in ongoing
litigation that quite possibly will reach the European Court of Justice.
A. Why Mutual Legal Assistance Matters Now: The Research Project
This Article is part of a larger research project examining the current state of
international MLA and builds upon those previous articles. This section first
highlights key findings from our team’s previous work on MLA. It next
describes the 2016 Microsoft Ireland case and the 2016 proposal for a new
U.S./U.K. framework for MLA. It concludes by outlining what this Article adds
to the overall MLA reform debate.
1. Previous Research Findings
A simple example shows how the globalization of data is affecting even
routine criminal investigations. Consider a burglary that takes place in Paris with
a French suspect and a French victim. In investigating the crime, French law
enforcement find that the suspect was using a U.S.-based e-mail service, and the
e-mails can only be retrieved from the relevant e-mail server located in the
United States. Under the current regime, to access the e-mails, French law
enforcement would need to file a MLAT request with the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ).12 The request would need to show “probable cause” of a crime—

11
12

829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016).
Swire, Hemmings & Vergnolle, supra note1 (manuscript at 35).
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the U.S. legal standard13—despite the crime having no connection to the United
States (other than the physical location of an e-mail server). This example shows
how MLA issues increasingly arise for routine criminal investigations. The need
for MLA requests is even more pervasive for cybercrime, drug smuggling,
money laundering, and other categories of crime where the criminal activity
itself often crosses borders.
The first article in the research project introduces the international MLA
regime,14 explaining the origins of MLATs and how electronic evidence requests
have come to overwhelm these systems.15 One important source of current
challenges is how the increased use of encryption has made many local wiretaps
ineffective, pressing law enforcement to seek evidence by alternate means.16 The
article examines the risks of failing to adequately reform the system.17 It
provides a number of potential administrative reforms that could reduce the
current average response time of ten months for MLA requests to the United
States. The article stresses an innovative way to avoid reliance going forward on
mutual legal assistance treaties; instead, reform may be more achievable and
effective through mutual legal assistance statutes.18 The article is thus entitled,
Mutual Legal Assistance in an Era of Global Communications: The Analogy to
the Visa Waiver Program.19 The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) was a response
to the globalization of travel—for the thirty-eight countries that participate
today, individuals can travel to and from the United States without the need for
an individualized visa interview. 20 Similarly, a new MLA statute can respond to
the globalization of evidence—countries that meet strict standards would use a
streamlined system to share evidence for criminal investigations. Since the
article was written, the United States and the United Kingdom have announced
one such proposal for an MLA statute,21 consistent in structure with the VWP
model supported by our research.

13

Id. (manuscript at 3).
Swire & Hemmings, Mutual Legal Assistance, supra note1 (manuscript at 3–12).
15 See id. (manuscript at 6–16).
16 See id. (manuscript at 22–25).
17 See id. (manuscript at 27–31).
18 See id. (manuscript at 43–45).
19 Id. (manuscript at 1).
20 Id. (manuscript at 48).
21 Devlin Barrett & Jay Greene, U.S. to Allow Foreigners to Serve Warrants on U.S. Internet Firms, WALL
ST. J. (July 15, 2016, 8:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-administration-negotiating-internationaldata-sharing-agreements-1468619305.
14
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The second article identifies the various stakeholders in this international
MLA regime, and their respective incentives and goals for reform.22 That article,
Stakeholders in Reform of the Global System for Mutual Legal Assistance, looks
to the interests of the U.S. government, non-U.S. governments, technology
companies, and public interest groups both in the United States and abroad.23
The article seeks to accurately describe the interests of these stakeholders to
better inform the debate for MLA reform. It identifies major goals of the various
actors, notably: (1) effective law enforcement access to evidence; (2) ensuring
that such access is achieved consistent with privacy and civil liberty goals; (3)
avoiding data localization, which might otherwise result where local law
enforcement insists on data being stored locally; and (4) preventing a greater
role for the International Telecommunications Union or other institutions that
might seek to impose top-down controls, risking splintering of the global
Internet.24
We have written two articles that examine in detail how the French and U.S.
systems compare for MLA purposes. The first, Understanding the French
Criminal Justice System as a Tool for Reforming International Legal
Cooperation and Cross-Border Data Requests,25 focuses on the procedural
differences between the two approaches. For example, the U.S. system clearly
separates the judicial and prosecutorial roles, while the French investigating
magistrate in many ways combines these roles.26 The second, A Mutual Legal
Assistance Case Study: The United States and France,27 focuses on the
substantive standards that apply before law enforcement can gain access to
electronic evidence. One important contrast is that the U.S. Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and other laws set forth detailed and
differing standards for judicial approval of different categories of electronic
evidence,28 while the French approach delegates considerable discretion to the
investigating magistrate to decide what evidence should be gathered.29 This
comparison of the French and U.S. legal systems, in turn, informs this Article’s

22

Swire & Hemmings, Stakeholders in Reform, supra note 1.
Id. at 1–16.
24 Id.
25 Suzanne Vergnolle, Understanding the French Criminal Justice System as a Tool for Reforming
International Legal Cooperation and Cross-Border Data Requests, in DATA PROTECTION, PRIVACY, AND
EUROPEAN REGULATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE (Tobias Bräutigam & Samuli Miettinen eds., 2016).
26 Id. (manuscript at 6–7).
27 Swire, Hemmings & Vergnolle, supra note1.
28 Id. (manuscript at 7–20).
29 Id. (manuscript at 20–34).
23
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broader comparison of EU and U.S. rules governing law enforcement access to
information.
2. The Microsoft Ireland Case and the Proposed U.S./U.K. MLA Agreement
In July 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in
Microsoft Ireland that the Stored Communications Act did not apply
“extraterritorially,” meaning that a search warrant issued to a company to seize
the contents of an e-mail account did not require that company to provide
electronic evidence that was stored outside of the United States.30 This
interpretation, that a search warrant could not compel production of electronic
evidence held by a U.S. company outside the United States, surprised some
commentators.31 The government had contended that search warrants could
apply similarly to subpoenas from the federal government.32 In cases such as
Bank of Nova Scotia, the government had successfully used subpoenas to require
companies to produce all financial or other data held by the company, regardless
of where in the world the information was stored.33
Until the Microsoft Ireland case (so called because the evidence at issue was
housed by Microsoft in Ireland), the United States had received far more MLA
requests than it had requested from other countries.34 Leading e-mail and social
network services have been based in the United States, so the U.S. government
could rely on the existence of U.S. headquarters to gain evidence in law
enforcement investigations. By contrast, other governments have had to meet
the requirements of U.S. law, such as ECPA, to gain access to e-mail, social
network, or other electronic evidence held by these companies. Other countries
aside from the United States have thus needed to use the MLA process, and so
had to meet probable cause or other U.S.-defined standards for gaining the
evidence. In the wake of Microsoft Ireland, the U.S. government appears to have
a far greater reason to support MLA reform—to gain evidence from Ireland and
other countries where relevant data is stored.
Even before the Microsoft Ireland decision, the DOJ was exploring
legislation, consistent with the VWP model, to streamline MLA requests. In
30

829 F.3d 197, 220 (2d Cir. 2016).
Jennifer Granick, The Microsoft Ireland Case and the Future of Digital Privacy, JUST SECURITY BLOG
(July 18, 2016, 12:46 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/32076/microsoft-ireland-case-future-digital-privacy/.
32 Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 220–21.
33 740 F.2d 817, 826–29 (11th Cir. 1984).
34 Telephone Interviews with Anonymous Department of Justice and National Security Council Officials
(Mar.–Apr. 2015).
31
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February 2016, the United Kingdom and the United States announced the outline
of an agreement that would act as an alternative to the MLAT process in place.35
As drafted, it would enable U.K. officials in some circumstances to send direct
requests to U.S. companies for data held in the United States, both for stored
data and for real-time wiretaps or other access to communications for
investigation.36 Further details of the proposed legislation emerged soon after
the Microsoft Ireland decision.37 The proposal would amend portions of the
wiretap laws, the Stored Communications Act, and the Pen/Trap Statute.38 It
would allow the United States to enter into reciprocal agreements with other
countries to enhance the DOJ’s ability to obtain electronic evidence abroad.39
The proposal, as presently drafted, attempts to carve out those individuals and
situations of greatest Fourth Amendment concern—data pertaining to a U.S.
citizen or legal permanent resident (wherever they are located) and persons
located within the United States, regardless of their nationality. In response to
the proposal, some U.S. civil society groups have expressed serious
reservations.40 Professors Jennifer Daskal and Andrew Woods have provided a
cautiously optimistic review of the proposed approach, if sufficient privacy and
civil liberties safeguards are included.41

35 Ellen Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, The British Want to Come to America—with Wiretap Orders and
Search Warrants, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/thebritish-want-to-come-to-america—with-wiretap-orders-and-search-warrants/2016/02/04/b351ce9e-ca86-11e5a7b2-5a2f824b02c9_story.html.
36 Id.
37 Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Joseph R. Biden,
President of the United States Senate (July 15, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/
doj_legislative_proposal.pdf.
38 Id.
39 Jonathan B. New, Patrick T. Campbell & David M. McMillan, DOJ Responds to ‘Microsoft Ireland’
Decision with Proposed Legislation and Bilateral Agreements Allowing Cross-Border Data Searches,
BAKERHOSTETLER (July 29, 2016), https://www.bakerlaw.com/mobile/alerts/doj-responds-to-microsoftireland-decision-with-proposed-legislation-and-bilateral-agreements-allowing-cross-border-data-searches.
40 They argue that the new agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom concerning
mutual legal assistance, “if finalized and approved, would ‘lower the human rights protections for accessing
private information of Internet users and give the U.K. unprecedented new authority to act extraterritorially
without adequate oversight.’” Eric Geller, British Police Want to Be Able to Serve Warrants Directly to U.S.
Tech Companies, DAILY DOT (Feb. 5, 2016, 4:57 PM), http://www.dailydot.com/layer8/uk-wiretaps-warrantsus-companies-negotiations. “This deal as reported would not require the U.K. to heighten its standards to
meet ours in the U.S., or even to meet the basic requirements of human rights law . . . .” Id.
41 Jennifer Daskal, A New UK-US Data Sharing Agreement: A Tremendous Opportunity, If Done Right,
JUST SECURITY BLOG (Feb. 8, 2016, 8:10 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/29203/british-searches-americatremendoUS-opportunity/; see also Jennifer Daskal & Andrew K. Woods, Cross-Border Data Requests: A
Proposed Framework, JUST SECURITY BLOG (Nov. 24, 2015, 8:03 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/27857/
cross-border-data-requests-proposed-framework/.
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The negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom
highlight the growing importance of MLA reform in the wake of Microsoft
Ireland, and the interest of the U.S. government in providing accelerated data
sharing mechanisms, at least for its close allies. We are pleased to see the U.S.
government taking steps to address MLA reform, and Swire has met with the
DOJ and other government officials to provide our questions and concerns about
the draft agreement. We are cautiously supportive of the VWP approach, if
appropriate civil liberties safeguards are included in the final drafting.
3. The Role of This Article for MLA Reform Debates
Swire has been convinced of the increasing importance of MLA issues at
least since his participation in President Obama’s Review Group on Intelligence
and Communications Technology in 2013, which supported a number of MLA
reforms.42 As part of efforts to further MLA reform, our research team has
chaired and participated in a variety of stakeholder meetings on the topic. This
Article reflects five statements that we have come to believe in the course of our
efforts:
1. Both the United States and the EU are stricter in some respects in the
limits that they set on government access to evidence for law
enforcement purposes.
2. Participants in the debates often have a weak understanding of the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. and EU legal systems in
this area. Some EU participants are skeptical that effective privacy
safeguards exist at all in the United States. Some U.S participants are
skeptical of non-U.S. legal systems, especially with respect to the
probable cause standard and First Amendment protections.
3. Stakeholders in both the United States and EU are noticeably reluctant
to agree to any weakening of specific, familiar safeguards that exist in
their own legal system.
4. Although each side is stricter in some respects and less strict in others,
we believe that there are generally effective rule-of-law protections

42 LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (Dec. 12, 2013)
[hereinafter REVIEW GROUP REPORT], https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_
final_report.pdf.
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against excessive law enforcement surveillance in both the U.S. and EU
Member States.
5. These generally effective safeguards provide a promising basis for
MLA reform along the lines of the VWP model, even where details of
the systems differ and specific safeguards on one side do not have
precise counterparts on the other.
This Article provides research and discussion to support these five
statements. By providing details about the relative strictness of the two systems,
the Article seeks to correct misunderstandings and provide a more informed
basis for further discussions of possible reform. Part IV of this Article also
examines likely consequences if MLA reform is blocked. As will be discussed,
in the absence of reform, we are likely to see diminution in privacy and civil
liberties protections, increased pressure for counter-productive data localization
proposals, and increased pressure for countries to deploy extraterritorial
methods for gaining access to evidence.
B. The Importance of the Relative Strictness of Protections to Broader
EU/U.S. Data Protection Issues
Along with MLA reform, studying the relative strictness of the EU and
United States is important to a second topic: the current litigation and debates
about whether the United States provides “adequate” protection of privacy and
thus is a lawful destination for flows of personal data from the EU.
Under the EU Data Protection Directive, which went into effect in 1998,
transfers of personal data from EU Member States to other countries such as the
United States are generally permitted only if the recipient jurisdiction has
“adequate” protections.43 From the time it was negotiated in 2000 until 2015, a
major legal basis for such transfers was the EU/U.S. Safe Harbor, under which
participating companies could lawfully send personal data to the United States.44
In 2015, the European Court of Justice struck down the Safe Harbor for lacking
adequacy in Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner.45 One of the concerns
expressed by the European Court of Justice was that U.S. government

43

Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 4, at 36–37.
See MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44257, US-EU DATA PRIVACY:
FROM SAFE HARBOR TO PRIVACY SHIELD (2016); Commission Decision, supra note 5 (determining that Safe
Harbor provided adequate protection for the transfer of data to the United States).
45 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. 1, 26.
44
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surveillance was so pervasive that the data of EU citizens was not safe once it
was in the United States.46 A related transfer mechanism, standard contract
clauses, is now facing a similar legal challenge in Ireland, and the Irish Data
Protection Commissioner has preliminarily found the challenge to be “wellfounded.”47
The issue of whether the United States has “adequate” protections also arises
under two instruments that go into full effect in 2018 and strengthen existing
privacy protections. The GDPR48 applies predominantly to private-sector
processing of personal information,49 and a new Directive governs law
enforcement access to personal data.50 An accurate assessment of the adequacy
of U.S. law enforcement access to information is thus vital to multiple aspects
of current EU data protection law.
Going forward, the crux of the concern is that if the European legal regime
makes a firm finding that the United States lacks an adequate legal order, then
transfers of personal data may be essentially blocked. Such a blockage would
affect large portions of trans-Atlantic commerce and communication. In light of
the high stakes, it is important to develop an accurate and detailed understanding
of the relative strengths and weaknesses of both the U.S. and EU systems for

46

Id. at 23.
Mary Carolan, Data Protection Groups Seek to Join Key High Court Case, IRISH TIMES (July 17, 2016,
1:07 PM), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/courts/high-court/data-protection-groups-seek-tojoin-key-high-court-case-1.2688868; Explanatory Memorandum from the Data Prot. Comm’r on Update on
Litigation Involving Facebook and Maximilian Schrems (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/
28-9-2016-Explanatory-memo-on-litigation-involving-Facebook-and-Maximilian-Schrems/1598.htm; see also
Jedidiah Bracy, Model Clauses in Jeopardy with Irish DPA Referral to CJEU, IAPP (May 25, 2016),
https://iapp.org/news/a/model-clauses-in-jeopardy-with-irish-dpa-referral-to-cjeu/; Mary Carolan, Schrems and
Facebook Privacy Case: Next Round Set for February, IRISH TIMES (July 25, 2016, 4:55 PM), http://www.
irishtimes.com/business/technology/schrems-and-facebook-privacy-case-next-round-set-for-february-1.273396
1; Julia Fioretti & Conor Humphries, Irish Privacy Watchdog Refers Facebook’s U.S. Data Transfers to EU
Court, REUTERS (May 25, 2016, 12:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/US-eu-privacy-facebookidUSKCN0YG2DL; Peter Swire, US Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and Reforms Since 2013, at 3 n.5 (Georgia
Inst. of Tech. Scheller College of Bus. Res. Paper No. 36, 2015) [hereinafter US Surveillance Law],
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2709619. This document was submitted as a White Paper to the Belgian Privacy
Authority at its request for its Forum on “The Consequences of the Judgment in the Schrems Case.”
48 Regulation 2016/679, supra note 8; see also Jan Dhont, Delphine Charlot & Jon Filipek, The EU General
Data Protection Regulation—Europe Adopts Single Set of Privacy Rules, ALSTON & BIRD: PRIVACY &
SECURITY BLOG (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.alstonprivacy.com/the-eu-general-data-protection-regulationeurope-adopts-single-set-of-privacy-rules/.
49 Regulation 2016/679, supra note 8, at 3. In addition to applying to private-sector processing of
information, the GDPR applies to non-national security and non-law enforcement processing by public agencies.
See Dhont, Charlot & Filipek, supra note 48.
50 Directive 2016/680, supra note 9.
47
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regulating government access to personal data. The next two Parts take up this
task.
II. WAYS IN WHICH THE EU IS MORE PRIVACY PROTECTIVE THAN THE
UNITED STATES
Since promulgation of its Data Protection Directive in 1995, the EU has
taken a comprehensive approach to privacy protection, with an emphasis on
business access to information. Part A summarizes main components of the EU
approach. Part B then briefly discusses three recent areas where the United
States has agreed to privacy changes to bring the two systems more closely
together: the Judicial Redress Act, Umbrella Agreement, and Privacy Shield.
A. EU Privacy Approach
In the EU, privacy protections for data include a comprehensive approach,
the Data Protection Directive, and, in the near future, the GDPR. In 2015, the
Schrems case struck down the Safe Harbor between the EU and the United
States.51 A pending case in Ireland, which could then be appealed to the
European Court of Justice, is expected to determine whether standard contract
clauses will continue to be a legitimate basis for data transfers between the EU
and the United States. Legal challenges have also been filed against the Privacy
Shield.52
1. The EU Takes a Comprehensive and Fundamental Rights Approach to
Privacy and Data Protection
“Europe has seen the gradual spread of privacy legislation since the German
state of Hesse enacted the first data protection statute in 1970.”53 Since the
1990s, European data protection laws generally had four features:
1) “typically they apply to both public and private sectors;”54

51

Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. at 1, 26.
Natasha Lomas, EU-US Privacy Shield Data Transfer Deal Faces Legal Challenge, TECHCRUNCH (Oct.
27, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/27/eu-us-privacy-shield-data-transfer-deal-faces-legal-challenge/;
Peter Sayer, A Second Privacy Shield Legal Challenge Increases Threat to EU-US Data Flows,
COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 3, 2016, 5:17 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/3138405/data-privacy/asecond-privacy-shield-legal-challenge-increases-threat-to-eu-us-data-flows.html.
53 PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 22 (1998).
54 FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 32–33 (1997).
52
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2) “they apply to a wide range of activities, including data
collection, storage, use, and dissemination;”55
3) “they impose affirmative obligations (often including
registration with national authorities) of anyone wishing to
engage in any of these activities; and”56
4) “they have few, if any, sectoral limitations—they apply
without regard to the subject of the data.”57

As a matter of fundamental rights, these concepts were incorporated into
Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which provides:
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.”58 Article 8 contains limitations that are “necessary in a
democratic society” for purposes such as “the interests of national security” and
“the prevention of disorder or crime.”59 The seminal document of the European
Union, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, explicitly applies these protections to personal
data in Article 16: “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data
concerning them.”60 Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union echoes the protection of private and family life,61 and Article 8
protects personal data.62 According to Article 52 of the Charter, any limitation
to the rights must be subject to the principle of proportionality and only made if
necessary to “genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by the
Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.”63
2. Data Protection Directive
The Data Protection Directive, promulgated in 1995 and in effect since 1998,
provides the legal structure for data protection in the EU.64 The Directive
55

Id.
Id.
57 Id. at 33.
58 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
59 Id.
60 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 16, Oct. 26, 2012,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
61 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 7, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, 397.
62 Id. art. 8.
63 Id. art. 52(1).
64 Prior to the adoption of TFEU, the Economic Community adopted data protection rules under the 1995
Economic Community Treaty’s clause that allowed for the harmonization of internal markets. See Treaty
Establishing the European Community, art. 95, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 173 (as in effect 1995) (now TFEU
art. 100(a)).
56
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imposes requirements on any person who collects or processes data pertaining
to individuals. These requirements include protections related to:
-

Fairness and lawfulness: The processing of the data is required to be
fair and lawful for a legitimate purpose. The data may not be kept longer
than necessary.65

-

Purpose limitation: Data must be collected for a specific purpose.66
Once obtained, the data cannot be additionally processed in a way that
is incompatible with the purpose initiating the collection of the data.67

-

Proportionality: The means employed to process the data must be
reasonably likely to achieve the stated objectives. The adverse
consequences of the processing must be justified in light of the
importance of the stated objective.68

-

Processing: To obtain data about a particular person, the individual69
whose data is involved must unambiguously consent to the collection
or another legitimate basis for the collection must exist.70 Once
obtained, the data cannot be additionally processed in a way that is
incompatible with the purpose initiating the collection of the data.71

-

Transparency: The holder of the data should keep the data subjects
informed about how their data is being used, both in instances when the
data is obtained directly from the individual and when it is obtained
indirectly.72

-

Notice: The holder of the data must inform the Data Protection
Authority before carrying out any automated processing of personal
information.73

65

Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 4, art. 6(1)(a)–(b), (e).
Id. art. 6(1)(b).
67 Id. Exceptions exist such as for processing data for “historical, statistical, or scientific purposes”
provided that appropriate safeguards are in place for the data processing. Id.
68 Id. art. 6(1)(c)
69 Individuals are referred to as “data subjects.” Id. art. 2(a).
70 Id. art. 7. These bases include performance of a contract to which the individual is a party; a legal
obligation of the controller; protection of a “vital interest” of the individual; part of an action carried out for the
“public interest;” or purposes carried out by the controller or a third party for a “legitimate interest.” Id.
71 Id.
72 See id. art. 11–12.
73 Id. art. 18(1).
66
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-

Access: An individual has a right to learn whether data have been
collected regarding the person, whether those data have been processed,
and to whom the data have been made available.74

-

Rectification, Erasure, and Blocking: An individual has the right to
“rectification,” “erasure,” and “blocking” of data that were not handled
in accordance with the law, as well as to ensure notification of these
actions to the third parties who gained access to this data.75

-

Automated decisions: The individual has a right to prevent automated
decisions about the individual from being made.76

-

Sensitive data: Stricter rules govern the processing of sensitive data that
reveal racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, trade-union
membership, religious beliefs, or data concerning health or sex life.77

-

Right to Object: The individual’s right to object to the processing of her
data is a central component of the European legal framework and
encompasses the concept that an individual has a right to informational
self-determination.78

Under the Data Protection Directive, Member States may place restrictions
on these rights “when such a restriction constitutes a necessary measure[] to
safeguard” national security, defense, public security, the investigation or
prosecution of criminal offenses, or an important economic interest of the
Member State.79
Under the E-Privacy Directive of 2002, Member States are required to ensure
the confidentiality of communications.80 The Directive particularly prohibits
“listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of interception or surveillance.”81
Exceptions apply when “necessary, appropriate and proportionate . . . within a
democratic society to safeguard national security (i.e. State security), defence,
74
75
76

Id.

77

Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 4, art. 12.
Id.
See id. art. 15. The right does not extend to automated processing, but is limited to automated decisions.

See id. art. 8. GDPR further tightens these restrictions. See Dhont, Charlot & Filipek, supra note 48.
Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 4, at art. 14.
79 Id. art. 13.
80 Directive 2002/58/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the
Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (Directive
on Privacy and Electronic Communications), art. 5(1), 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37, 43.
81 Id.
78
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public security, and the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of
criminal offenses.”82
To ensure protection of these rights, each Member State must establish a
Data Protection Authority (DPA), with powers including: (1) the power to
investigate; (2) the power to intervene, including the power to order blocking,
erasure, or destruction of data; and (3) the power to engage in legal proceedings
when rules or regulations are violated.83 The Data Protection Directive created
the Article 29 Working Party, comprised of representatives of DPAs, to provide
guidance on data protection issues.84
The Data Protection Directive sets out a number of legal bases for
international data transfers.85 Under Article 25, personal data can be transferred
to a non-EU country if that country ensures an adequate level of protection.86
Due to its lack of comprehensive privacy legislation, the United States has not
qualified for a finding that it generally provides adequate protections.87
Article 26 authorizes other legal bases for international data transfers, including
standard contract clauses, binding corporate rules, and, until it was struck down,
the Safe Harbor agreement.88
3. GDPR and Police and Criminal Justice Authorities Directive
In 2016, the EU completed the GDPR, which takes effect in 2018 and will
replace the Data Protection Directive.89 Key new provisions of the GDPR
address: (1) notification of security breaches; (2) new requirements for
processors (contractors who act on behalf of data controllers); (3) liability for
damages; (4) designation of data protection officers; (5) international data
transfers; (6) accountability obligations; (7) cross-border processing; and (8)

82

Id. art. 15.
Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 4, art. 28; see also Charter, supra note 61, art. 8(3); TFEU, supra note
60, art. 16(3) (“Compliance with these rules shall be subject to the control of independent authorities.”).
84 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 4, art. 29.
85 CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE BUSINESS 124 (2003).
86 SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 53, at 24.
87 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. 1.
88 European Commission, Model Contracts for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, EUROPA,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/transfer/index_en.htm (last updated Nov. 24,
2016).
89 European Commission, Reform of EU Data Protection Rules, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/Justice/dataprotection/reform/index_en.htm (last updated Nov. 24, 2016).
83

SWIRE_KENNEDY-MAYO GALLEYSPROOFS2

2017]

PRIVACY OF GOVERNMENT REQUESTS

2/27/2017 2:18 PM

633

sanctions of up to four percent of worldwide revenues.90 The GDPR provides
extensions of individual rights, including the right to be forgotten, the right to
data portability, and implementation of principles of data protection by design
and data protection by default.91
Along with the GDPR, the EU in 2016 promulgated the Police and Criminal
Justice Authorities Directive, which will apply to the processing of personal data
for law enforcement purposes.92 This Directive does not directly govern the
actions of the Member States the way the GDPR does,93and the European Data
Protection Supervisor in 2012 criticized an earlier, but similar, version of the
Directive for not providing sufficient protections.94 Article 35 of the Directive
contains an adequacy requirement similar in structure to the Data Protection
Directive and GDPR.95 This Directive also takes full effect in 2018.96
4. Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner Litigation
As discussed above, the European Court of Justice in October 2015 struck
down the EU/U.S. Safe Harbor as lacking adequate protections for the personal
data of EU citizens when data is transferred to the United States.97 This decision
in the litigation between Austrian privacy advocate Max Schrems and Facebook
Ireland led to the negotiations of the EU/U.S. Privacy Shield, finalized in 2016.
Follow-on litigation continues in Ireland, where the Data Protection
Commissioner has made an initial finding that similar concerns about adequacy
apply to standard contract clauses—an important alternative method for
transferring personal data out of the EU to countries that lack a general adequacy
finding. The case has been referred for trial by the Irish High Court, scheduled
for February 2017.98
90 Dhont, Charlot & Filipek, supra note 48; Guidance: What to Expect and When, ICO.,
https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/data-protection-reform/guidance-what-to-expect-and-when/ (last visited
Oct. 25, 2016) (discussing the potential future effect of the GDPR on the U.K. after Brexit).
91 VĚRA JOUROVÁ, HOW DOES THE DATA PROTECTION REFORM STRENGTHEN CITIZENS’ RIGHTS? (2016).
92 See Directive 2016/680, supra note 9.
93 Id.
94 Peter Hustinx, then European Data Protection Supervisor, said he was “seriously disappointed with the
proposed Directive . . . in the law enforcement area.” European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion of the
European Data Protection Supervisor on the Data Protection Reform Package 4 (Mar. 7, 2012),
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2012/
12-03-07_EDPS_Reform_package_EN.pdf.
95 See Directive 2016/680, supra note 9, art. 35, at 120.
96 Id. art. 63, at 130.
97 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. 1, 26.
98 See Carolan, supra note 47.
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B. U.S.-EU Negotiations About Increasing U.S. Privacy Protections
As part of ongoing negotiations between the EU and United States, the
United States has agreed to a number of privacy protections, especially in the
wake of the European Court of Justice’s Schrems decision. We briefly examine
three reforms, which address EU concerns that U.S. privacy protections—
including law enforcement access to data—have not been sufficiently strict: (1)
the Judicial Redress Act; (2) the “Umbrella Agreement” for law enforcement
sharing and use; and (3) the Privacy Shield.
1. Judicial Redress Act
One longstanding EU privacy concern has been that the U.S. Privacy Act of
1974 provided judicial remedies for U.S. persons (U.S. citizens and legal
permanent residents) but not to others, such as EU citizens who lived outside of
the United States.99 The Privacy Act has provided U.S. persons with the right to
bring claims against the federal government for damages due to inappropriate
disclosure by the government of information that it held, in addition to rights to
access and correct individuals’ government records.100 In February 2016, the
United States enacted the Judicial Redress Act, which can extend privacy
protections and remedies available under the Privacy Act to persons from
qualifying countries outside of the United States.101
2. Umbrella Agreement
In June 2016, the United States and the EU concluded negotiation of the
“Umbrella Agreement,” providing a data protection framework for personal data
exchanged between the United States and the EU for the prevention, detection,
investigation, and prosecution of crimes for law enforcement purposes.102 The

99 European Commission Memorandum MEMO/15/5612, Questions and Answers on the EU-US Data
Protection “Umbrella Agreement” (Sept. 8, 2015) [hereinafter European Commission Memorandum]; Mary
Ellen Callahan, Nancy Libin & Lindsey Bowen, Will the Judicial Redress Act Address Europeans’ Privacy
Concerns?, JENNER & BLOCK (Mar. 2, 2016), https://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/14908/original/
MEC_Libin_Bowen_IAPP_March_2016.pdf?1457973439.
100 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (2012).
101 Judicial Redress Act of 2015, H.R. 1428, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted). The language of the law extends
the protections to qualifying non-U.S. individuals of covered countries. Id. at § 2. Covered countries are
designated by the agreement of the Attorney General, Secretary of State, Secretary of Treasury, and Secretary
of Homeland Security. Id. § 2(d). At the time of this writing in late 2016, no countries have yet qualified.
102 Council of Europe Press Release 305/16, Enhanced Data Protection Rights for EU Citizens in Law
Enforcement Cooperation: EU and U.S. Sign “Umbrella Agreement” (June 2, 2016).
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agreement specifically includes terrorism within the crimes it covers.103 With
regard to the framework, the Umbrella Agreement focuses on the following: (1)
limiting the usage of data to that related to addressing criminal activity; (2)
restricting onward transfer of the data to instances where prior consent is
obtained from the country that initially provided the data; (3) requiring retention
periods for the data obtained to be made public; and (4) providing the individual
to whom the data refers the right to access and rectify inaccuracies.104 The
Umbrella Agreement does not authorize data transfers, but does provide agreed
upon safeguards for data shared for law enforcement purposes, addressing prior
EU concerns about the lack of agreed upon safeguards.105
3. Privacy Shield
In July 2016, the European Commission adopted the EU-U.S. Privacy
Shield. The agreement sets forth commitments that qualify for adequacy by U.S.
companies, detailed explanations of U.S. laws, and commitments by U.S.
authorities. U.S. companies wishing to import personal data from Europe under
the Privacy Shield accept obligations on how that data can be used, and those
commitments are legally binding and enforceable.106 The U.S. government,
through the DOJ and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, assures
that access for law enforcement and national security purposes is subject to
safeguards and oversight mechanisms, with the addition of an ombudsman who
will follow up on complaints and inquiries by EU individuals.107 EU individuals
who believe that their data have been misused will have several avenues of

103 Press Release, Department of Justice, Joint EU-U.S. Press Statement Following the EU-U.S. Justice and
Home Affairs Ministerial Meeting (June 2, 2016); European Commission Memorandum, supra note 99. National
security surveillance programs that involve data transfers are specifically excluded from the Umbrella
Agreement. Agreement Between the United States of America and the European Union on the Protection of
Personal Information Relating to the Prevention, Investigation, Detection, and Prosecution of Criminal Offenses,
art. 3, 10, 16, https://epic.org/privacy/intl/data-agreement/Umbrella-Agreement-EU-Release.pdf.
104 Transatlantic Data Flows: Restoring Trust Through Strong Safeguards, at 13, COM (2016) 117 final
(Feb. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Transatlantic Data Flows].
105 Id. at 8.
106 Id. at 9. Lothar Determann has asserted that the EU should consider making the reach of the Privacy
Shield “bidirectional” with the “more effective, specific and up-to-date US privacy laws” applying in Europe.
Lothar Determann, Adequacy of Data Protection in the USA: Myths and Facts, 6 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 244,
250 (2016). His contention is that data protection laws in continental Europe have “a 45-year history and always
contemplated damages, fines, and even imprisonment. But in practice there are only a few and only recent
examples of actual enforcement of data protection laws in Europe.” Id. at 245.
107 See Transatlantic Data Flows, supra note 104, at 9.
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redress, including cost-free alternative dispute resolution.108 Companies
transferring human resources data from Europe will be subject to the decisions
of the relevant EU DPA.109 The DPA will be provided a formal procedure to
refer complaints to the U.S. Department of Commerce or the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission. The Privacy Shield is scheduled to undergo annual joint reviews
by the European Commission and the U.S. Department of Commerce.110
European regulators have announced they will not challenge the Privacy Shield
at least until its first annual review, scheduled for 2017.111
In sum, the comprehensive EU privacy laws provide numerous protections
that are not explicitly included in U.S. law; nonetheless scholars such as Kenneth
Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan have found that U.S. corporate practice “on
the ground” compares favorably to EU practice, and often provides more
effective privacy protections than found in many EU countries.112 In addition, in
ways that narrow the legal gaps between the EU and United States, recent
intensive negotiations between EU and U.S. officials have led to significant U.S.
reforms to address EU concerns, notably for issues of government collection and
use of data under the Judicial Redress Act, the Umbrella Agreement, and the
Privacy Shield.
III. “PLUS FACTORS”: WAYS IN WHICH U.S. LAW IS MORE PRIVACY
PROTECTIVE THAN EU LAW
The United States has a complex legal regime that protects privacy in
numerous ways relevant to government access to personal information. The
discussion here highlights what we call “plus factors”—ways in which U.S.
privacy protections reasonably can be considered at least as strict or stricter than
EU privacy protections. For purposes of MLA reform, these plus factors are
important because, as discussed in Part IV, the stricter U.S. provisions can create
obstacles to reform due to U.S. stakeholders’ reluctance to weaken the standards.
For other purposes, such as EU assessment of the lawfulness of transferring
personal data to the United States, the plus factors are also significant. In

108 European Commission Press Release IP/16/2461, European Commission Launches EU-U.S. Privacy
Shield: Stronger Protection for Transatlantic Data Flows (July 12, 2016).
109 See Transatlantic Data Flows, supra note 104, at 10.
110 Id.
111 Aaron Souppouris, EU Will Watch Privacy Shield for a Year Before Challenging, ENGADGET (July 27,
2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/07/27/eu-data-protection-privacy-shield-annual-review/.
112 See KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND: DRIVING
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 173–74 (2015).
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assessing the overall adequacy of U.S. safeguards, we believe it is rational to
give credit for ways in which the U.S. system provides equivalent or greater
protection. If adequacy determinations omit the privacy-protective effects of the
plus factors, then the determination may find lack of adequacy based on
relatively minor omissions from the European list of privacy protections,
without giving corresponding weight to significant privacy protections that
apply in the United States but not the EU.
The discussion here focuses on two types of plus factors: (1) structural
protections in U.S. law against excessive surveillance and (2) limits on
government access to information for law enforcement purposes. We also briefly
discuss legal limits on foreign intelligence investigations, but do not give a
complete account of those because MLA predominantly applies to law
enforcement rather than intelligence investigations.113
A. Structural Protections Against Excessive Surveillance
Numerous safeguards concerning government access to information arise
from the structure of government in the United States, as a constitutional
democracy under the rule of law. In 2015 testimony for the Belgian Privacy
Commission, Swire provided an extensive discussion for a European audience
of how these safeguards operate.114 Although often taken for granted by U.S.
lawyers, many relevant features of U.S. law are different than European civil
law systems, or even from common law jurisdictions such as the United
Kingdom that lack centuries of a written constitution interpreted by an
independent judiciary that is binding on the legislative and executive branches.
The architecture of the U.S. government is designed to restrain the power of
government and to ensure individual rights and freedoms, including privacy
113 MLATs address sharing of information for law enforcement purposes. The EU-U.S. MLAT, as with
other MLATs such as U.S.-France, explicitly state that they do not apply to foreign intelligence investigations.
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Between the United States of America and the European Union, EU-U.S., June
25, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 10-201.1, art. 1, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/180815.pdf; Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty Between the United States of America and France, Fr.-U.S., Dec. 10, 1998, T.I.A.S.
No. 13010, art. 1, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/121413.pdf. Nonetheless, some criminal
investigations overlap with foreign intelligence investigations, so that evidence shared for the former may be
used for foreign intelligence purposes; for example, an anti-terrorism investigation may qualify as “law
enforcement,” such as investigation into a terrorist attack, but also gather evidence for national security purposes
such as combatting the terrorist group abroad.
114 PETER SWIRE FOR THE BELGIAN PRIVACY AUTHORITY, US SURVEILLANCE LAW, SAFE HARBOR, AND
REFORMS SINCE 2013 (2015), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Schrems-White-Paper-12-18-2015.
pdf.
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rights such as limits on searches and seizures. These structural protections
include: (1) a time-tested system of checks and balances; (2) judicial
independence; (3) constitutional protections of individual rights; and (4)
democratic accountability.
1. A Time-Tested System of Checks and Balances
The U.S. Constitution created a time-tested system of checks and balances
among the three branches of government. The separation of powers among the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches matches the views of Montesquieu
in his 1748 treatise on “The Spirit of Laws”—divided power among the three
branches protects “liberty” and guards against “tyrannical” uses of power.115 The
U.S. Constitution provides detailed checks and balances among the three
branches, as set forth in Article I (legislative branch), Article II (executive
branch), and Article III (judicial branch).
Compared to EU Member States, the U.S. Constitution has been in
continuous operation since 1790, far longer than most Member States. In
contrast to some recently admitted Member States, where there have been
questions about the effective protection of constitutional rights and the rule of
law,116 the U.S. constitutional system of checks and balances has been enduring
and remains in vigorous effect today.
2. Judicial Independence
The judiciary is a separate branch of government in the United States,
established by Article III of the Constitution.117 Federal judges are nominated
by the President and confirmed by the Senate.118 The independence of federal

115

MONTESQUIEU, COMPLETE WORKS VOL. I BOOK XI 199 (London 1777) (“When legislative and
executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty;
because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them
in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and
executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary
controul; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might
behave with violence and oppression. There would be an end of every thing, were the same man, or the same
body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of
executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.”).
116 European Commission Press Release IP/16/2643, Rule of Law: Commission Issues Recommendation to
Poland (July 27, 2016); European Commission Press Release IP/13/327, The European Commission Reiterates
Its Serious Concerns over the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of Hungary (Apr. 12, 2013).
117 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
118 Id. art. II, § 2.
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judges is provided in the Constitution—appointments are for the lifetime of the
judge, with removal only by impeachment, and with a guarantee of no
diminution of salary.119
European data protection law emphasizes the importance of an independent
decision-maker to protect privacy rights.120 The precise guarantees of judicial
independence in EU Member States vary considerably.121 The lifetime tenure
and protection against diminution of salary provides a strong guarantee of the
independence of U.S. federal judges.
Since the 1803 Supreme Court case of Marbury v. Madison, the judicial
branch has the authority to engage in judicial review.122 Judges have the legal
power to strike down a statute that is contrary to the Constitution. For executive
actions, judges have the legal power to issue binding orders to prevent the
executive branch from violating either the U.S. Constitution or applicable
statutes.
3. Constitutional Protections of Individual Rights
The U.S. Constitution enumerates a set of rights that protect the individual
against government action. As just mentioned, U.S. judges have the power of
judicial review. This power serves as a systemic check against abuse—a judge
may strike down an entire statute or government program as unconstitutional. In
addition, these rights protect individuals against unconstitutional action in a
criminal prosecution—defendants can argue, for instance, that there was a

119 Id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”).
120 As the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party stated in its Privacy Shield Opinion: “The WP29 recalls
that ideally, as has also been stated by the CJEU and the ECtHR, [surveillance] oversight should be in the hands
of a judge in order to guarantee the independence and impartiality of the procedure.” Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party, Opinion 01/2016 on the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Draft Adequacy Decision, at 41, 16/EN WP
238
(Apr.
13,
2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2016/wp238_en.pdf; see EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS,
SURVEILLANCE BY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS SAFEGUARDS AND REMEDIES IN THE EU:
MAPPING MEMBER STATES’ LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 52 t.4 (2015) [hereinafter FRA REPORT], http://fra.
europa.eu/en/publication/2015/surveillance-intelligence-services.
121 See generally European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Study on the Functioning of Judicial
Systems in the EU Member States, CEPEJ (2014)4final (Mar. 14, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effectivejustice/files/cepj_study_scoreboard_2014_en.pdf.
122 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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violation of their rights under the Fourth Amendment (search and seizure) or
First Amendment (free speech).
For government access to personal data, the Fourth Amendment plays a
particularly important role.123 It states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.124

As discussed in Swire’s 2015 testimony, the jurisprudence concerning the
Fourth Amendment has responded to changing technology. Federal courts in
recent years have issued a string of Fourth Amendment rulings to protect
privacy, such as Riley v. California125 (warrant needed to search cell phones),
United States v. Jones126 (warrant needed for GPS attached to a car), Kyllo v.
United States127 (warrant needed for high-technology search of home conducted
from the street), and United States v. Warshak128 (warrant needed to access e123 In our view, there has been some confusion about the way that the Fourth Amendment applies to nonU.S. persons, in the wake of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). Briefly, the Fourth
Amendment applies to searches and seizures that take place within the U.S. (such as on data transferred to the
U.S.), and to searches against U.S. persons (U.S. citizens as well as permanent residents) that take place outside
of the U.S. For foreign intelligence collected in the U.S., such as personal data transferred from the EU by a
company, the Fourth Amendment continues to apply because all searches must meet the overall Fourth
Amendment test that they be “reasonable.” See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (holding
that foreign intelligence searches must satisfy Fourth Amendment reasonableness standards). The EU
Commission has recognized this rule: “While the Fourth Amendment right does not extend to non-U.S. persons
that are not resident in the United States, the latter nevertheless benefit indirectly from its protections, given that
the personal data are held by U.S. companies with the effect that law enforcement authorities in any event have
to seek judicial authorisation (or at least respect the reasonableness requirement).” European Commission,
Commission Implementing Decision of 12.7.2016 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, C(2016) 4176
final, ¶ 127 (July 7, 2016), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.207.01.
0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:207:FULL. For data that the U.S. government collects in the United States,
statutory protections apply in addition to the Fourth Amendment, such as the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2522, and the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712.
124 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
125 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
126 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see also David Cole & Federico Fabbrini, Bridging the Transatlantic Divide?
The United States, the European Union, and the Protection of Privacy Across Borders, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L.
220, 230–33 (2016) (discussing the application of Jones to warrants based on length of the search).
127 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
128 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). Despite the fact that the Warshak case is not a U.S. Supreme Court
decision, the case has had significant impact. See Tamar R. Gubins, Warshak v. United States: The Katz for
Electronic Communication, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 741–52 (2008); Erin E. Wright, The Right to Privacy
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mail). We further discuss the probable cause requirement and other aspects of
Fourth Amendment protection below, in connection with specific law
enforcement and intelligence rules.
Other constitutional protections for information about a person’s information
include:
-

-

-

First Amendment—This amendment protects free speech, assembly,
and association, providing a wide range of protections against
government interference with freedom of thought and expression. With
regards to privacy, the First Amendment protects a range of anonymous
speech,129 and protects the right of individuals to gather or communicate
privately.130
Third Amendment—Because soldiers had been quartered in homes
during colonial times, the Founders specifically outlawed this practice
under the Constitution. This protection supports the privacy of one’s
home.131
Fifth Amendment—The prohibition on compelled self-incrimination
protects the privacy of an individual’s thoughts. In the context of
electronic evidence, this provision of the U.S. Constitution has been
used to restrain the government from requiring an accused person from
providing passwords and encryption keys.132

These constitutional rights, enforced by independent judges, provide systemic
protections against overreach by the other branches of government.
4. Democratic Accountability
As part of the longer U.S. history of skepticism of excessive government
power, two examples illustrate the willingness of the elected branches to set
limits on government surveillance. When excessive surveillance became known,

in Electronic Communications: Current Fourth Amendment and Statutory Protection in the Wake of Warshak
v. United States, I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 531, 543–52 (2007–08).
129 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
130 Givhan v. W. Line Consol. School Distr., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979) (holding that a public employee
cannot be fired based on the content of private communications); Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored
People v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (holding that the First Amendment guarantee of
free association included a right to private, anonymous membership in an organization).
131 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
132 Id. amend. V; see also In re Grand Jury, 670 F.3d 1335, 1349 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 668 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
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the democratically-elected branches responded with new and significant
safeguards.
The Watergate scandal under President Nixon was followed by a host of
significant government reforms, including the Privacy Act of 1974, major
expansion of the Freedom of Information Act in 1974, and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.133 Following the Edward Snowden
revelations that began in 2013, the U.S. government undertook over two dozen
significant surveillance reforms, including two notable statutes. The USA
FREEDOM Act of 2015 created multiple new limits on foreign intelligence
surveillance, and Congress also enacted the Judicial Redress Act in 2016.134
These legislative and executive safeguards are evidence of an ongoing political
culture in the United States that sets limits on surveillance powers,
complementing the protection afforded by the Constitution and the independent
judiciary.135
B. Protections to Ensure Limits on Law Enforcement Investigations
Consistent with constitutional requirements, the U.S. system provides
numerous limits on law enforcement investigations. Plus factors, where the
limits are at least as strict as EU practice and often stricter, include: (1) oversight
of searches by independent judicial officers; (2) probable cause of a crime as a
relatively strict requirement for both physical and digital searches; (3) even
stricter requirements for government use of telephone wiretaps and other realtime interception; (4) the exclusionary rule, preventing prosecutors’ use of
evidence that was illegally obtained, is supplemented by civil suits; (5) other
legal standards that are relatively strict for government access in many nonsearch situations, such as the judge-supervised “reasonable and articulable
suspicion” standard under ECPA; (6) transparency requirements, such as notice
to the service provider of the legal basis for a request; (7) lack of data retention
requirements for Internet communications; and (8) lack of limits on use of strong
encryption.

133 See Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306,
1325–26 (2004).
134 Judicial Redress Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-126, 130 Stat. 282 (2016), https://www.congress.gov/bill/
114th-congress/house-bill/1428/text.
135 Swire, US Surveillance Law, supra note 47, at 32. This document was submitted as a White Paper to the
Belgian Privacy Authority at its request for its Forum on “The Consequences of the Judgment in the Schrems
Case.”

SWIRE_KENNEDY-MAYO GALLEYSPROOFS2

2017]

PRIVACY OF GOVERNMENT REQUESTS

2/27/2017 2:18 PM

643

1. Oversight of Searches by Independent Judicial Officers
Standard practice in the United States is that search warrants are issued by a
judge, who is a member of the judiciary, separate from the executive branch.136
Under the usual MLA process, a federal prosecutor appears before a federal
judge. After review by the DOJ, the prosecutor provides evidence from the
requesting country, asking the judge to issue an order requiring production of
the evidence. Federal judges have strong legal guarantees of independence—
Article III of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that federal judges have lifetime
tenure and cannot have their salaries reduced.137
This review by an independent judge, separate from the executive branch, is
far from universal under European legal systems. Approximately half of the
Member States lack a review by an independent judge when the government
seeks to engage in surveillance.138 As discussed in the comparative case study
of U.S. and French criminal procedure by Swire, Hemmings, and Vergnolle,
French public prosecutors typically combine the prosecutorial and judicial roles
when determining what evidence to gather for a criminal prosecution.139
2. Probable Cause of a Crime as a Relatively Strict Requirement for Both
Physical and Digital Searches
Most important for surveillance issues, the Fourth Amendment limits the
government’s ability to conduct searches and seizures, and warrants can issue
only with independent review by a judge. The Fourth Amendment governs more
than simply a person’s home or body; its protections apply specifically to

136 The U.S. Department of Justice’s manual explains how to obtain electronic evidence in criminal
investigations. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 1–56 (2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf.
137 U.S. CONST. art. III. More specifically, the constitutional text provides that federal judges retain their
positions during “good behavior,” which means in practice they have lifetime tenure except in extraordinary
circumstances, notably when Congress impeaches the individual judge. See Walter F. Pratt, Judicial Disability
and the Good Behavior Clause, 85 YALE L.J. 706, 712 (1976).
138 FRA REPORT, supra note 120, at 51–52. Even in the United Kingdom, which shares a common law
history with the United States, the independent judiciary plays a far smaller role in overseeing criminal
investigations than in the United States. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, § 5 (Eng.). The FRA
Report identifies five Member States that engage in the collection of signals intelligence (collection that, at least
in the initial stage, targets large flows of data and not an individual). None of these Member States—France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—has a judicial body involved in the approval of
signal intelligence. FRA REPORT, supra note 120, at 55 t.5.
139 Swire, Hemmings & Vergnolle, supra note 1 (manuscript at 22).
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communications, covering a person’s “papers and effects.”140 In criminal
prosecutions, the law enforcement officer must determine whether the Fourth
Amendment requires a warrant to conduct a search, or whether it is an instance
where a lesser requirement will satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.141 If law enforcement officers are incorrect in their
assessment, the evidence collected may be excluded from evidence in a criminal
trial.
The search warrant is issued by a neutral magistrate, a judge, only after a
showing of probable cause that there is incriminating evidence in the place to be
searched.142 Probable cause that a crime has been committed must be established
by the law enforcement officer by “reasonably trustworthy information” that is
sufficient to cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that an offense has
been or is being committed or that evidence will be found in the place that is to
be searched.143 In the warrant, the law enforcement officer is required to list,
with specificity, the items to be searched and seized.144
Based on our MLA research, the probable cause standard is different than
the legal rules in other countries, and generally considered stricter than non-U.S.
practice before the government can access evidence. For instance, formal
investigations under the French system provide the investigating magistrate with
broad powers to order the search of any place where one can discover objects or
data.145
3. Even Stricter Requirements for Government Use of Telephone Wiretaps
and Other Real-Time Interception
In U.S. law, the real-time interception of electronic data is recognized as
holding heightened privacy risks, and consequently an order authorizing such
interception must meet a stricter standard of proof. Wiretaps are understood as

140

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
In this context, the search is considered to be reasonable if law enforcement obtained a valid warrant
before the search was conducted. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 352
(5th ed. 2015).
142 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
143 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 171 (1949).
144 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 144 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
supra note 136, at 63.
145 Swire, Hemmings & Vergnolle, supra note 1 (manuscript at 22).
141
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requiring “probable cause plus,” with requirements before the courts permit realtime interception.146
1. An interception order requires “a particular description” of both the
“nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the
communication is to be intercepted” and “the type of communications
sought.”147
2. The application for an interception order must explain “whether or not
other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or be too
dangerous.”148 Failure to exhaust alternate, less-intrusive means of
obtaining the same information can result in the denial of an application
for an interception order.149
3. The application must specify the period of time during which the
interception will take place, or a reason why the applicant has probable
cause to believe no termination date should be set because additional
covered communications will continue to occur.150 Minimization rules
apply so non-relevant communications are not authorized by the
wiretap.151
4. There are multiple rounds of review within the DOJ before a wiretap
request can go to a judge—magistrates on their own motion cannot
approve a wiretap.152
The judge must make a determination in favor of the government on all of
these factors to issue an order permitting the interception.153 Once the order is
approved, the government is responsible for complying with minimization
procedures. Specifically, the order is to be executed as soon as possible, is to be
conducted in such a way as to minimize the incidental collection of
146

18 U.S.C. § 2518(2) (2012). The Wire Tap Act is “codified at Title I of ECPA.” SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ,
supra note 141, at 353.
147 § 2518(1)(b) (2012).
148 § 2518(1)(c).
149 Id.
150 § 2518(1)(d).
151 § 2518(5); see, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 527 F.3d 891, 904–05 (9th Cir. 2008), (describing the
government’s minimization efforts).
152 § 2518(1); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(9) (defining an approving judge as “(a) a judge of a United States
district court or a United States court of appeals; and (b) a judge of any court of general criminal jurisdiction of
a State who is authorized by a statute of that State to enter orders authorizing interceptions of wire, oral, or
electronic communications”).
153 § 2518(3). If the request is denied, the court must notify the individual who was the target of the request
within ninety days of the denial. § 2518(8)(d).
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communications not subject to the order, and is to be terminated once the
communication authorized under the order is obtained.154 Within ninety days of
the termination of the order, the individual who was searched must be notified
by the court of the existence of the order.155
These probable-cause-plus requirements for wiretaps are stricter than
practice in other countries. For instance, the United Kingdom has requested
access to real-time interceptions in the proposed MLA reform package with the
United States under merely the rules that apply to other electronic evidence.156
4. The Exclusionary Rule, Preventing Prosecutors’ Use of Evidence That
Was Illegally Obtained, Is Supplemented by Civil Suits
U.S. criminal law provides individual remedies to address evidence obtained
during a search that was illegally conducted. In a criminal trial in the United
States, the courts enforce constitutional rights by excluding evidence that the
government obtains illegally.157 In addition, the courts bar evidence that is “the
fruit of the poisonous tree”—additional evidence similarly cannot be used in
court if it is derived from an illegal search.158 Since the 1960s, this “exclusionary
rule” has served as an important practical motivation for police officers to follow
the rules for searches and seizures.
With regard to civil remedies, an individual who has been the subject of a
search that violated the Fourth Amendment can file a lawsuit suit seeking
monetary damages.159 When the law enforcement officials conducting the search
are state or local employees, the individual files a civil rights suit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.160 In a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff can recover compensatory
damages and reasonable attorney’s fees. The courts have permitted suits by U.S.

154

§ 2518(5).
§ 2518(8)(d)(1).
156 Devlin Barrett & Jay Greene, U.S. to Allow Foreigners to Serve Warrants on U.S. Internet Firms, WALL
ST. J. (July 15, 2016, 8:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-administration-negotiating-internationaldata-sharing-agreements-1468619305.
157 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961). For details on the exclusionary rule, see JOSHUA DRESSLER &
ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE VOL. 1: INVESTIGATION 347–92 (5th ed. 2010). In
addition to exclusion from evidence under the Fourth Amendment, certain statutes, such as the Wiretap Act,
provide for exclusion of evidence for violation of the statutory requirements. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a).
158 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963).
159 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 141, at 354.
160 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). In addition to § 1983 claims, certain federal statutes provide for a basis for a
civil suit. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a) (2012); The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701(b) (2012).
155
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citizens and non-U.S. citizens living in the United States.161 The U.S.
exclusionary rule, backed up by the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine and
civil remedies, provides clear individual remedies against illegal searches.
The adversarial system in the United States makes this remedy quite different
than the laws in many European countries. For example, in the French system, a
search needs to be necessary to establish the “truth,” and any evidence
“necessary to establish the truth” can be presented to the bodies investigating
and ultimately prosecuting the crime.162
5. Other Legal Standards that Are Relatively Strict for Government Access
in Many Non-Search Situations, Such As the Judge-Supervised
“Reasonable and Articulable Suspicion” Standard Under ECPA
ECPA defines categories of information that retain the requirement of
judicial approval but require less than a probable cause showing. Location
information and many e-mails have historically been available to the
government when a judge has been satisfied that reasonable suspicion exists to
believe that the data are relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation based on
“specific and articulable facts” presented by the government.163 This
requirement of reasonable and articulable suspicion means that the government
must meet the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement for
reasonableness, but does not require a search warrant because the level of
intrusion is considered lower than that in a full search.164

161 The text of § 1983 states that an aggrieved person is “any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982)
(“Aliens . . . have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.”); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971) (“[A]liens . . . have a right to enter and abide
in any State . . . ‘on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws.’” (quoting
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948))); MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983
LITIGATION 27 (3d ed. 2014). Because § 1983 claims do not extend to instances where the law enforcement
officials conducting the search were federal officers, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized an implied remedy
known as a Bivens claim, so named for the 1971 case where the claim was first discussed. Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971); see also SCHWARTZ, supra, at 7–11. Generally,
the same legal principles and procedures apply in a Bivens claim as in a § 1983 claim. Id. at 10.
162 For a full comparison of these concepts of French and U.S. laws, see Swire, Hemmings & Vergnolle,
supra note 1.
163 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
164 The standard derives from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which established the reasonable and
articulable suspicion test for brief police stops of individuals. For one discussion of the relative role of Terry,
probable cause, and other standards, see CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 21–47 (2007).
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More recently, federal appellate courts have interpreted ECPA to say that
requests under § 2703(b) for content of communications, including e-mails,
require a probable cause warrant.165 Some magistrates have placed even further
limitations on obtaining content, such as the length of time the content can be
retained and limits on searching within a computer for all the files in that
computer.166
Compared with the approaches in France and other EU countries, the U.S.
analysis is similar to that provided for the probable cause standard. Once again,
an independent judge in the United States must make the decision whether the
legal standard has been met for the government to access the evidence, in
contrast for instance to the French approach where the investigating magistrate
can generally seek access to all evidence deemed helpful to the investigation.
6. Transparency Requirements, Such As Notice to the Service Provider of
the Legal Basis for a Request
U.S. law and practice is to have clear notice in the judge’s order to produce
evidence of the legal basis for the order, for instance by citing the specific
statutory provision under which the order is issued.167 This notice enables the
recipient of the order to research the lawful basis to help determine whether there
are reasons to challenge the order. By contrast, our interviews with companies
that receive requests for electronic evidence is that many EU and other
jurisdictions lack this information about the legal basis for the evidence request.
7. Lack of Data Retention Rules for Internet Communications
Data retention requirements have been a prominent feature of European
debates about how to achieve privacy protection consistent with law
enforcement and national security goals. In 2006, the EU promulgated a Data
165 See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding the Fourth Amendment
prevents law enforcement from obtaining stored e-mail communications without a warrant based on probable
cause); United States v. Ali, 870 F. Supp. 2d 10, 39 n.39 (D.D.C. 2012), (“[I]ndividuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the content of emails stored, sent, or received through a commercial internet service
provider.” (quoting United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 178 (6th Cir. 2011))).
166 See United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 134, 137–39 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Because the degree of privacy
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been impacted by the advance of technology, the challenge is
to adapt traditional Fourth Amendment concepts to the Government’s modern, more sophisticated investigative
tools.”); see also In re Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d 74, 78 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding the government “must be
more discriminating when determining what it wishes to seize, and it must make clear that it intends to seize
only the records and content that are enumerated and relevant to its present investigation”).
167 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)–(e); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 136, at 127–34.
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Retention Directive, which required publicly available electronic
communications services to retain records for an extended period of time, for
purposes of fighting serious crime.168 For instance, for e-mail and other
electronic communications, the communications services were required to retain
“the name(s) and address(es) of the subscriber(s) or registered user(s) and user
ID of the intended recipient of the communication.”169 In Digital Rights Ireland
v. Minister of Communications,170 the European Court of Justice struck down
that Directive due to privacy concerns related to excessive access to the retained
data and lack of assurances that the records would be destroyed at the end of the
retention period.171 In the wake of that judgment, a number of EU Member States
reinstated modified data retention requirements for telephone and Internet
communications.172
By contrast, the United States does not require data retention for e-mail or
other Internet communications. Internet data retention bills have been
introduced in Congress, but have not come close to passage.173 The Federal
Communications Commission has issued rules concerning retention of
telephone records for up to eighteen months.174 Those rules apply only to
telephone toll records, which are a diminishing portion of all communications
as users increasingly rely on non-telephone Internet communications and often
have unlimited phone calls, so toll records are no longer required for billing
purposes.175
In light of the significant privacy concerns explained in Digital Rights
Ireland, the presence of data retention rules in the EU and their general absence
in the United States support the view that the absence of such rules is a

168 Directive 2006/24/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the Retention
of Data Generated or Processed in Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic
Communications Services or of Public Communications Networks and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 2006
O.J. (L 105) 54.
169 Id. art. 5(1)(b)(2)(ii).
170 Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister of Communications, 2014
EUR-Lex 62012CJ0293 (Apr. 8, 2014), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:
62012CC0293&from=EN.
171
Id. ¶71.
172 Federico Fabrini, Human Rights in the Digital Age: The European Court of Justice Ruling in the Data
Retention Case and Its Lessons for Privacy and Surveillance in the United States, 28 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 65, 88
(2015).
173 See Resources on Data Retention, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 26, 2012),
https://cdt.org/insight/resources-on-data-retention (collecting materials on the issue).
174 47 C.F.R. § 42.6 (2016).
175 Id.
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significant plus factor for the United States in comparing the privacy regimes
that apply to both law enforcement and foreign intelligence investigations.
8. Lack of Limits on Use of Strong Encryption
As of November 2016, there have been calls for new limits on strong
encryption in a growing number of EU countries, including a joint press
conference by the Interior Ministers of France and Germany.176 In the United
Kingdom, in addition to relatively strict rules relating to encryption in the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000,177 authority to limit end-to-end
encryption is included in the Investigatory Powers Bill, which was enacted in
2016.178 In our view and the view of many other experts, such limits on the use
of strong encryption pose serious threats to user privacy.179
Debates about the use of strong encryption have also occurred recently in the
United States, most prominently expressed by FBI Director James Comey in the
controversy about encryption of the Apple iPhone.180 The United States
historically permitted use of strong encryption within the country but limited
exports of strong encryption through export control laws. The bulk of these
export controls were eliminated in 1999.181 Based on Swire’s extensive
experience with encryption policy in the United States, we believe legislation
limiting the use of strong encryption has a fairly low likelihood of passage.182

176 Natasha Lomas, Encryption Under Fire in Europe as France and Germany Call for Decrypt Law,
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 24, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/24/encryption-under-fire-in-europe-as-franceand-germany-call-for-decrypt-law/.
177 See Bert-Jaap Koops, Crypto Law Survey, Overview per Country, Version 27.0, CRYPTOLAW (Feb.
2013), http://www.cryptolaw.org/cls2.htm.
178 Cara McGoogan, What Is the Investigatory Powers Bill and What Does It Mean for My Privacy?,
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 29, 2016, 6:29 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/11/29/investigatorypowers-bill-does-mean-privacy.
179 See, e.g., Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balance Between Public Safety and Privacy:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of Peter Swire); HAROLD
ABELSON ET AL., KEYS UNDER DOORMATS: MANDATING INSECURITY BY REQUIRING GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO
ALL DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS (2015), http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/97690/MIT-CSAILTR-2015-026.pdf.
180 Lev Grossman, Inside Apple CEO Tim Cook’s Fight with the FBI, TIME (Mar. 17, 2016), http://time.com/
4262480/tim-cook-apple-fbi-2/.
181 Press Briefing by Deputy National Security advisor Jim Steinberg, Attorney General Janet Reno, Deputy
Secretary of Defense John Hamre, Under Secretary of Commerce Bill Reinsch, and Chief Counselor for Privacy
at OMB Peter Swire, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y (Sept. 16, 1999), http://www.peterswire.net/
archive/privarchives/Press%20briefing%20Sept.%2016%201999.html.
182 In 1999, Swire chaired the White House Working Group on Encryption when the United States repealed
most of the export controls on export of strong encryption. See id. Swire has since written extensively on
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Meanwhile, a number of EU Member States retain stricter laws governing
encryption than the United States, including France and Hungary.183 Indeed,
U.S.-based technology companies have taken a global position of leadership on
use of strong encryption, bolstering the likelihood that encryption-enabled
privacy protections will continue to develop in the United States.
C. Protections to Ensure Limits on Foreign Intelligence Investigations
MLA requests typically are for evidence used in law enforcement
investigations rather than for national security or foreign intelligence
investigations.184 Swire has written extensively in the past on the system of U.S.
foreign intelligence law,185 and also plans in a separate forum to do a more
detailed comparison of U.S. and EU access for foreign intelligence purposes.186
In this Article, we therefore address the U.S. rules governing foreign intelligence
investigations in summary form.
Especially in light of the extensive U.S. surveillance reforms since 2013,
independent researchers, including Professor Ian Brown of Oxford University,
have written that:
the legal framework for foreign intelligence collection in the US, as
enhanced by the Presidential Policy Directive of January 2014,
contains much clearer rules on the authorisation and limits on the

encryption law and policy. See, e.g., Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 416 (2012).
183
Swire, Hemmings & Vergnolle, supra note 1 (manuscript at 29–30); Freedom of the Net 2016, Hungary
Country Profile, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2016/hungary (last visited Jan.
30, 2017); see also Glyn Moody, Proposed Hungarian Law Would Allow Government to Suspend Key Human
Rights Whenever There is a ‘Terror Threat Situation’, TechDirt (Feb. 4, 2016, 11:23 PM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160203/09004533506/proposed-hungarian-law-would-allow-governmentto-suspend-key-human-rights-whenever-there-is-terror-threat-situation.shtml.
184 There is some overlap between criminal and foreign intelligence surveillance investigations, such as
where a government seeks to jail a potential terrorist for criminal activities. Also, the line between law
enforcement and national security or foreign intelligence investigations is not necessarily the same in each
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, MLA requests focus on law enforcement investigations, so comparison of the
safeguards for criminal prosecutions is thus central to MLA reform efforts. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL
DIVISION, PERFORMANCE BUDGET FY 2017 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET 22–30 (2016), https://www.Justice.gov/jmd/
file/820926/download.
185 Swire, supra note 47, at 23–43 (discussing reforms to U.S. surveillance law since 2013); REVIEW GROUP
REPORT, supra note 42, at 53–57 (history of U.S. foreign intelligence regime); Swire, supra note 133.
186 Swire has submitted testimony as an independent legal expert in Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r,
on U.S. and EU legal rules for surveillance.
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collection, use, sharing and oversight of data relating to foreign
nationals than the equivalent laws of almost all EU Member States.187

The U.S. legal framework, among others, contains the following safeguards
in connection with foreign intelligence surveillance:
1) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) creates a
comprehensive legal system for foreign intelligence surveillance.
Independent federal judges play the central role in overseeing
government surveillance requests, and those judges have access in the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to the classified
information necessary for assessing government requests.188
2) Under FISA and the Fourth Amendment, judges retain their power to
oversee all electronic surveillance conducted within the United States.
A search is generally either (a) conducted in the criminal context, in
which case a judge must approve a warrant showing probable cause of
a crime; or (b) conducted in the foreign intelligence context, in which
case the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court must authorize the
surveillance pursuant to FISA and subject to the reasonableness
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. These are the principle ways
that an electronic communications search is carried out lawfully within
the United States.189

187 IAN BROWN ET AL., TOWARDS MULTILATERAL STANDARDS FOR FOREIGN SURVEILLANCE REFORM 3
(2015), https://cihr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Brown_et_al_Towards_Multilateral_2015.pdf. For a
detailed comparison of U.S. and EU surveillance law practices, similarly concluding that U.S. protections are
generally greater, see JACQUES BOURGEOIS ET AL., ESSENTIALLY EQUIVALENT: A COMPARISON OF THE LEGAL
ORDERS FOR PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://datamatters.sidley.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Essentially-Equivalent-Final-01-25-16-9AM3.pdf.
188 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885(c) (2012).
189 When these searches occur under a mandatory order, they generally follow either the foreign intelligence
or law enforcement regime. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) permits a limited collection for a period of a year or less at the
direction of the President and with the approval of the Attorney General, for (1) the collection of communications
exclusively between or among foreign powers; and (2) the collection of technical intelligence, which does not
include spoken communications of individuals, from property under the control of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C.
§ 1802(a).
Some government access to information does not rise to the level of a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment. For instance, under what is called the “third party doctrine,” government access to telephone
metadata held by a “third party” (the phone company) is permitted constitutionally without a judge-approved
warrant. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–46 (1979). In response, the ECPA of 1986 created statutory
protections for telephone metadata, requiring a judicial order by statute rather than it being required by the
Constitution. See Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment “Papers” and the Third-Party
Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 247, 264–65 (2016).
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3) Perhaps the most dramatic change in U.S. surveillance statutes since
2013 concerns reforms of § 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which
provided the government with broad powers to obtain “documents[] and
other items.”190 After the September 11 attacks, § 215 was used as a
basis for collecting metadata on large numbers of phone calls made in
the United States. The USA FREEDOM Act abolished bulk collection
under § 215 and two other similar statutory authorities. These limits on
collection apply to both U.S. and non-U.S. persons. A far narrower
authority now exists, based on individualized selectors associated with
terrorism and judicial review of each proposed selector.191
4) Section 702 of FISA applies to collections that take place within the
United States, and only authorizes access to the communications of
targeted individuals, for listed foreign intelligence purposes.192
Misunderstanding about the PRISM program under § 702 traces to the
original and since-revised Washington Post story, which stated that
“[t]he National Security Agency and the FBI are tapping directly into
the central servers of nine leading U.S. Internet companies” to extract a
range of information.193 This statement was incorrect. In practice,
PRISM operates under a judicially-approved and judicially-supervised
directive, pursuant to which the government sends a request to a U.S.based provider for collection of targeted “selectors,” such as an e-mail
address.
5) There have also been concerns about Upstream as a mass collection
program. In fact, the U.S. government receives communications under
both Upstream and PRISM based on targeted selectors, with actions
under each program subject to FISC review. Concerning scale, a
declassified FISC opinion found that over 90% of the Internet
communications obtained by the NSA in 2011 under § 702 actually
resulted from PRISM, with less than 10% coming from Upstream.194

190

See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001).
These reforms are codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129
Stat. 268, 269–76.
192 Section 702 is codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a.
193 See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S. British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet
Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013) (emphasis added), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broadsecret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html?utm_term=.ad91d2af80a0.
The story was revised to explain that a leaked document said that there was direct access; in fact, the leaked
document was misleading or incorrect; § 702 does not authorize direct access.
194 See [Caption Redacted], No. [Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618, at *9–11 (F.I.S.C. Oct. 3, 2011).
191
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The U.S. intelligence community now releases an annual Statistical
Transparency Report,195 with the statistics subject to oversight from
Congress, Inspector Generals, the FISC, the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board, and others.196 For 2015, there were 94,368 “targets”
under the § 702 programs, each of whom was targeted based on a
finding of foreign intelligence purpose.197 That is a tiny fraction of U.S.,
European, or global Internet users. Rather than having mass or
unrestrained surveillance, the documented statistics show the low
likelihood of communications being acquired for ordinary citizens.198
6) There is a comprehensive oversight system for foreign intelligence,
including Senate and House intelligence committees, agency inspectors
general, privacy offices in executive agencies, and the independent
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Each of these institutions
gains access to the classified information needed to provide
oversight.199

195 Transparency reports have been released for every year since 2013. Office of the Dir. of Nat’l
Intelligence, Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities—Annual Statistics
for Calendar Year 2015, IC ON THE RECORD (May 2, 2016), https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/transparency/
odni_transparencyreport_cy2015; Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Statistical Transparency Report
Regarding Use of National Security Authorities—Annual Statistics for Calendar Year 2014, IC ON THE RECORD
(Apr. 22, 2015), http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/transparency/odni_transparencyreport_cy2014; Office of the
Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities—
Annual Statistics for Calendar Year 2013, IC ON THE RECORD (June 26, 2014), http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
transparency/odni_transparencyreport_cy2013.
196 For a listing of the multiple oversight entities, see REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 269.
197 The statistical reports define “target” in detail, and my assessment is that the number of individuals
targeted is lower than the reported number.
198 The 2016 Statistical Transparency Report reiterates the targeted nature of the surveillance: “Section 702
only permits the targeting of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to
acquire foreign intelligence information.” Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Statistical Transparency
Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities—Annual Statistics for Calendar Year 2015, IC ON THE
RECORD (May 2, 2016), https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/transparency/odni_transparencyreport_cy2015.
199 See generally U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/;
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, http://intelligence.house.
gov/; IC INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/
about/leadership/inspector-general; Exec. Order No. 13719, Establishment of the Federal Privacy Council, 81
Fed. Reg. 7685–89 (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-02-12/html/2016-03141.htm; The
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act), JUSTICE
INFORMATION SHARING, https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1283 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016)
(describing the independence of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB)). For recent PCLOB
reports, see PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM
CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_
Records_Program.pdf; PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE
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7) There are numerous transparency safeguards in the U.S. foreign
intelligence system, including: federal agency reports on the number
and type of surveillance orders; company transparency reports on such
orders; provisions in the USA-FREEDOM Act that require
transparency of new legal decisions by the FISC; and new policies for
transparency to the extent possible of FISC opinions.200
8) The Executive Branch has multiple safeguards in place to supplement
legislative safeguards, including Presidential Policy Directive 28,
which recognizes the privacy interest of non-U.S. persons and includes
other privacy protections for foreign intelligence activities.201
With respect to U.S. safeguards for government access to information for
U.S. foreign intelligence and law enforcement investigations, there are
important plus factors that have often not been recognized in MLA reform
debates and discussions about the adequacy of protections when data are
transferred from the EU to the United States.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR MLA REFORM WHEN BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND
THE EU ARE STRICTER ON PRIVACY IN IMPORTANT RESPECTS
Part II of this Article highlighted ways that the EU is more privacy
protective, including for issues of government access to data. Notable examples
are the comprehensive privacy laws for data held by the private sector, in the
GDPR, and by law enforcement in the 2016 Directive. Part III highlighted ways
that the United States is more privacy protective. The most prominent legal
example is the probable cause standard as judged by an independent magistrate,
but the plus factors discussion showed multiple respects in which the privacy
rules limiting U.S. government access are stricter.
This Part analyzes the implications for MLA since both the EU and the
United States are stricter about privacy in important, yet different, respects. This
Part first examines the implications of our description on those who advocate
for privacy, notably civil society groups and privacy regulators. Based on both
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (2014),
https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf.
200 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, §§ 603, 604, 129 Stat. 268, 295–97 (2015); see also
Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security
Authorities—Annual Statistics for Calendar Year 2013, IC ON THE RECORD (June 26, 2014), http://icontherecord.
tumblr.com/transparency/odni_transparencyreport_cy2013.
201 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Policy Directive PPD-28, Signals Intelligence
Activities (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2014sigint_mem_ppd_rel.pdf.
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theory and our experience in working with these supporters of stricter privacy
protections, the relative strengths of both the United States and the EU create
important obstacles to MLA reform, in ways that have not been well appreciated
to date.
The discussion next turns to three models for the future of MLA, especially
in the wake of the 2016 Second Circuit decision in Microsoft Ireland, which set
important new limits on U.S. government access to e-mails held in overseas
servers. We call the three models: (1) MLA status quo; (2) extraterritoriality;
and (3) Visa Waiver Program (VWP). We assess the ability of each model both
to protect privacy and civil liberties, and to fulfill legitimate law enforcement
requests. We conclude that a well-designed VWP is the best available approach.
Although we believe a well-designed VWP is the most promising option for
privacy protection, enacting such a statute would likely require legislation that
has weaker privacy provisions in some respects than the status quo in either in
the United States or the EU. It is understandably a difficult decision for privacy
supporters to accept compromise on these provisions, such as permitting access
to some records in the United States, without a showing of probable cause. Yet,
we conclude, overall privacy protection is likely to be greater with such a
compromise, as part of a well-designed VWP, than with other approaches.
A. The Effects on Privacy Supporters of Both the United States and the EU
Being Stricter in Important Respects
We turn now to a discussion of the challenges that MLA reform poses to
privacy supporters, such as civil society groups and data protection officials.
Any significant streamlining of the MLA process would likely require some of
the recipient country’s rules to be relaxed. For instance, an EU request may
succeed without going before a U.S. judge to prove probable cause. A U.S.
request may mean that personal data goes to the U.S. without being subject to
every requirement of European data protection law. Or law enforcement
information might go to the United States without the Member State Data
Protection Agency having direct access to the records held by U.S. law
enforcement.
We argue below that overall privacy is likely to be enhanced via welldesigned MLA reform that follows the VWP model. Nonetheless, based both on
theory and our experience in deliberations on these issues, the relaxation of
specific current requirements can be quite difficult for privacy supporters to
accept.
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1. Difficulties in Compromising on Stricter U.S. Privacy Provisions
The longstanding and, in our view, admirable efforts of the Digital Due
Process Coalition illustrate this point. Since 2010, the Digital Due Process
Coalition has enlisted a wide range of support both from civil society and from
leading technology companies for a set of principles about how to update ECPA.
Notably, the principles require having a search warrant based on probable cause
for government access to “communications that are not readily accessible to the
public,” and for “location information regarding a mobile communications
device.”202 This reform effort has made considerable progress, notably with
passage by the House of Representatives in April 2016 of H.R. 699, the Email
Privacy Act, which would amend ECPA in ways broadly consistent with the
principles of the Digital Due Process Coalition.203
There is a painful tension, however, between this potential codification of
the probable cause standard for U.S. government access and the fact that
probable cause is “an exacting, privacy-protective standard that most countries
in Europe and elsewhere in the world do not follow.”204 To the extent that MLA
reform would streamline some access for EU countries, and those countries do
not agree to amend their laws to meet the probable cause standard, it would
require some modification of the U.S. probable cause standard, precisely at the
moment when achievement of the Digital Due Process Coalition’s goals appear
within sight.
U.S. privacy supporters thus have a number of reasons for caution in
supporting any MLA reform that modifies the probable cause standard. First,
allowing non-U.S. governments access with less than probable cause goes
against the simple principle that probable cause is appropriate for any
government access. Second, procedurally, MLA reform proposals might muddy
the waters and make it more complex and difficult to achieve final passage of
the Email Privacy Act. Third, as a psychological matter, it can be difficult for
privacy supporters to agree to any weakening of the probable cause standard
when they have worked for years to establish that standard, even if they agree
202 Our Principles, DIG. DUE PROCESS (2010), http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=99629E402551-11DF-8E02000C296BA163.
203 Sophia Cope, House Advances Email Privacy Act, Setting the Stage for Vital Privacy Reform, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/04/hoUse-advances-email-privacy-actsetting-stage-vital-privacy-reform.
204 Ian Brown, Vivek Krishnamurthy & Peter Swire, Reforming Mutual Legal Assistance Needs
Engagement Beyond the U.S., LAWFARE (Mar. 1, 2016, 7:38 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/reformingmutual-legal-assistance-needs-engagement-beyond-US.
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that it is a different context when governments other than the United States gain
access to information about non-U.S. persons.
We have seen these concerns of privacy supporters arise in the deliberations
of the Working Group on Cross-Border Data Requests. This Working Group,
consisting of civil society groups, academics, and technology companies, met
beginning in late 2015 to discuss MLA reform, with discussions chaired by
(alphabetically) Jennifer Daskal, Jim Dempsey, Greg Nojeim, Peter Swire, and
Andrew Woods.205 After initial discussions, Jennifer Daskal and Andrew Woods
posted one version of a proposed framework for what MLA reform principles
could look like.206 The structure of the proposed framework was consistent with
the VWP model—a statutory reform to ECPA that would apply to countries with
sufficiently strong legal safeguards, and which would provide the United States
with reciprocal access to evidence held in other participating countries.
The framework focused on what we sometimes called “the easy case” for
MLA reform,
where the requesting entity makes an adequate showing of three things:
(i) the requesting government has a legitimate interest in the criminal
activity being investigated; (ii) the target is located outside the United
States; and (iii) the target is not a US person (defined to include US
citizens and legal permanent residents).207

In terms familiar to conflict of laws experts,208 the interests of the requesting
government (such as an EU government) are potentially quite strong in these
circumstances (a crime, the target outside of the United States, and the target is
not a U.S. person), while the interests of the United States are relatively weak
(the evidence is held in the United States or is held by a U.S.-based company).
As discussed in our 2015 article about stakeholders in MLA reform, there is
a significant congruence between the interests of civil society and technology
companies—both have strong reasons to support effective privacy protections
for the companies’ users out of a sincere desire to protect privacy and as good
business for global companies who wish to assure non-U.S. customers that data
will be carefully protected.209 In light of this congruence, as one participant in
205

Our research project at Georgia Tech. provided financial support for meetings of the Working Group, as
did a variety of civil society groups and companies.
206 Daskal & Woods, supra note 41.
207 Id.
208 JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: A NORTHWEST PERSPECTIVE 94 (1985).
209 Swire & Hemmings, Stakeholders in Reform, supra note 1, at 10–14.
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the discussions of the Working Group, Swire was initially optimistic about
reaching a consensus document, either in a relatively detailed format that was
discussed initially, or in a more high-level set of principles that was discussed
as the U.S./U.K. agreement was nearing announcement in April, 2016.
After considerable efforts to reach agreement, the Working Group was
unable to reach consensus. In Swire’s view, one important reason for the lack of
consensus was the understandable reluctance of civil society groups to agree to
text that was weaker than existing U.S. protections. For instance, the published
November version of the proposed framework would allow access with “a strong
factual basis” (not “probable cause”) to believe a crime was committed.210 For
clear reasons, the proposal did not require a finding of probable cause by a
neutral magistrate—most countries even in Europe do not follow that U.S.
practice, so a probable cause requirement would render the framework
unworkable in almost all instances. Civil society groups expressed concerns
about the lack of possible new safeguards as well as possible weakening of other
safeguards, such as the current practice of the DOJ performing a First
Amendment review before turning over evidence to the requesting country.211
This recent experience with the Working Group on Cross-Border Data
Requests shows how the existence of stricter privacy protections in the United
States creates difficulties for MLA reform. The authors’ view is that MLA
reform is likely to be more privacy protective in the long run than the status quo,
because the status quo of protections is likely to be weakened due to localization
and other effects. It is difficult, however, for privacy supporters to agree publicly
to weakening specific safeguards that have long been the subject of their support
in litigation, legislation, and public advocacy.
2. Difficulties in Compromising on Stricter EU Privacy Protections
Along with these obstacles to weakening any U.S. privacy protections that
are stricter than EU protections, there are also obstacles from the European side
to accepting any MLA reform that omits European safeguards.

210

Daskal & Woods, supra note 41.
Greg Nojeim of the Center for Democracy and Technology proposed stricter standards for government
access to metadata as an example of one such possible new safeguard to offset weakening due to relaxation of
the probable cause or other standards. Greg Nojeim, MLAT Reform Proposal: Protecting Metadata, LAWFARE
(Dec. 10, 2015, 2:43 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/mlat-reform-proposal-protecting-metadata.
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An initial obstacle to acceptance of reform in Europe is the widespread
skepticism of the effectiveness of U.S. privacy protections. Based on Swire’s
work on EU data protection issues for two decades,212 one source of the
skepticism is the lack of an overarching, comprehensive privacy law in the
United States that corresponds to the Data Protection Directive or General Data
Protection Regulation.213 The U.S. system of privacy protection arises from a
complex set of constitutional, statutory, administrative, and common law
protections. In the words of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, an
EU-level group of national privacy regulators, “the framework of statutes,
procedures and policies is fragmented,” with the consequence that the Working
Party concluded in 2016 that it could not assess the level of protection for data
accessed by law enforcement authorities.214
The skepticism of U.S. government practices clearly became greater after the
Snowden revelations that began in 2013. In October 2015, the European Court
of Justice in the Schrems case struck down the EU/U.S. Safe Harbor agreement
for providing inadequate protection of personal data transferred from the EU to
the United States.215 The Advocate General’s opinion in that case stated that the
United States practiced “mass and indiscriminate surveillance,” and relied for
this conclusion in part on a 2013 report from the EU Commission.216 Swire has
written in detail concluding that multiple such assertions are over-stated and
notably do not reflect the over two dozen surveillance reforms that the United
States has made since 2013.217 Despite growing recognition of the depth and
breadth of the privacy safeguards that apply to U.S. intelligence activities, our
view is that skepticism about the effectiveness of these safeguards remains
widespread in Europe.
Apart from any mistaken skepticism about U.S. safeguards, EU law places
important limits on the extent to which the EU can transfer personal data to other
212

Swire began work in 1996 for the project that became SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 53.
Accord Hearing on Examining the EU Safe Harbor Decision and Impact for Transatlantic Data Flows,
Joint Hearing Before H.R. Energy & Commerce Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade and Commc’ns and
Tech., 114th Cong. 11 (2015) (testimony of Marc Rotenberg, President of EPIC), https://epic.org/privacy/
intl/schrems/EPIC-EU-SH-Testimony-HCEC-11-3-final.pdf (discussing concerns by other nations over the U.S.
sectoral approach to privacy regulation).
214 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 120, at 53.
215 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. 1, 26.
216 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 EUR-Lex
62014CC0362 (Sept. 23, 2015).
217 Swire, US Surveillance Law, supra note 47; Peter Swire, Don’t Strike Down the Safe Harbor Based on
Inaccurate Views of U.S. Intelligence Law, IAPP (Oct. 5, 2015), https://iapp.org/news/a/dont-strike-down-thesafe-harbor-based-on-inaccurate-views-on-u-s-intelligence-law.
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jurisdictions for MLA purposes. The EU Data Protection Directive has long
permitted transfers to third countries, subject to limited exceptions, only where
there is adequate protection of personal data.218 The court in Schrems gave an
apparently strict interpretation to this requirement, saying that the legal standard
for transfers was “essential equivalence” to EU legal protections.219 To the
extent MLA reform offers less than “essential equivalence,” then that reform
would risk being overturned by the European courts.220
To show adequacy or essential equivalence, data protection officials have
often underscored the need for a comprehensive system of protections that match
the extensive list of EU protections. One example comes from the opinion in
May 2016 of the European Data Protection Supervisor, concerning the draft
Privacy Shield agreement. The opinion provided a section on “[i]ntegrating all
main data protection principles,” as well as a section on “[l]imiting derogations”
(i.e., exceptions).221 The opinion listed concerns about implementation of a
number of specific principles, and concluded “the Privacy Shield should
therefore be amended to better integrate all main EU data protection
principles.”222 The analysis did not discuss the role of the sorts of plus factors of
stricter safeguards discussed in Part III. To the extent there was any deviation
from the EU list, the opinion appears to be quite skeptical about whether the
legal requirements are met. In terms of MLA reform, there is thus uncertainty
about the extent to which such reform could deviate from the numerous details
of EU data protection law.
B. Implications for MLA Reform
We next analyze three main options for MLA reform, as informed by the
discussion about how both the United States and the EU sometimes have stricter
privacy rules for law enforcement access to data. In brief, the three options are:
218

Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 4, art. 25–26, 45–46.
Schrems, 2015 E.C.R. 1 at 21-22, 25. For an analysis of how “essential equivalence” applies to U.S.
safeguards, see Swire, US Surveillance Law, supra note 47, at 3–9.
220 A new Directive took effect in May 2016, and Member States are supposed to pass implementing
legislation by May 2018, “on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal
offences or the execution of criminal penalties.” Directive 2016/680, supra note 9. Articles 35, 36, and 37 of the
Directive establish an adequacy regime similar to the 1998 Data Protection Directive, and this Directive will
thus play an important role governing law enforcement data requests going forward. Id. art. 35–37.
221 EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, 4/2016 OPINION ON THE EU-U.S. DRAFT PRIVACY SHIELD
AGREEMENT 7 (May 30, 2016) (emphasis added), https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/
mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2016/16-05-30_Privacy_Shield_EN.pdf.
222 Id. (emphasis added).
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1) MLA status quo, where the Microsoft Ireland rule applies. In this
approach, there are significant limits on the ability of EU countries to
gain access to data held in the United States, due to the relatively strict
rules of the Fourth Amendment and ECPA. There are also significant
limits on the ability of the United States to use a warrant to get data held
in Ireland or other countries.
2) Widespread extra-territoriality, where governments require companies
doing business in their jurisdiction to produce records available to that
company anywhere in the world. This option emphasizes the ability of
a government to exert pressure on a company that has any assets or
employees in the jurisdiction. One can think of this approach as the
Bank of Nova Scotia model, where bank regulators insist on access to
records held by the bank outside of the country. The Second Circuit in
Microsoft Ireland found that Congress had not previously expressed its
intent to give extra-territorial effect for warrants, but Congress could
overcome that finding with a new statute explicitly providing for extraterritorial reach.
3) Visa Waiver Program model, where countries such as the United States
and EU Member States negotiate agreements, similar in structure to the
proposed U.S./U.K. agreement, that provide streamlined access to the
requesting country when sufficient privacy and related safeguards are
in place.
The analysis here focuses on which approach will best protect privacy over
time. It also discusses other goals our previous work on MLA reform has
highlighted, especially providing law enforcement legitimate access to evidence
and promoting a well-functioning Internet, such as by discouraging
balkanization and data localization proposals.
The MLA status quo approach, at least initially, might seem to protect
privacy more strictly than the other approaches. For EU requests to the United
States, data would be produced only where the requesting country meets its own
rules, and then also satisfies the often laborious process to get an MLAT court
order in the United States. For U.S. requests to the EU, after Microsoft Ireland,
the United States would apparently need to go through a similar process,
deciding to make the request in the United States, and then needing to get
cooperation from Ireland or another country to actually produce the data.
We believe that long-run incentives, however, would undermine the privacy
protections of the MLA status quo approach. One factual finding of our MLA
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research program, after all, is the strong trend toward globalization of data and
criminal evidence, such as e-mails, social network communications, web
surfing, and myriad other kinds of potentially relevant evidence.223 Another
factual finding is how the spread of effective encryption increasingly blocks the
effectiveness of local wiretaps.224 As these trends continue, the delays in the
MLA status quo will become politically more difficult to tolerate.
Countries that object to the MLA status quo can gain faster access to
evidence in two main ways. First, the country can pass data localization
requirements, so that the evidence resides in that jurisdiction. Russia has this
type of law in effect, as part of the overall Russian system for surveilling its
domestic communications,225 and a growing array of other countries have passed
or proposed localization laws.226 Localization laws, along with other negative
consequences for the operation of the Internet,227 have clearly negative privacy
effects for data held by U.S.-based companies—data are available in the
localizing country, and are no longer subject to the Fourth Amendment and
ECPA protections of the current MLA process. Second, the country can enact
extra-territorial requirements, with the negative privacy consequences of the
second of our three models.
The widespread extra-territoriality model clearly has negative effects for
privacy. The main feature of an extra-territoriality approach is that it is

223 The trend toward data being held in countries outside of the requesting jurisdiction is indicated by
research such as Jonathan Mayer, The Web Is Flat, WEB POLICY (Oct. 30, 2013), http://webpolicy.org/2013/
10/30/the-web-is-flat/ (study showing pervasive flow of web browsing data outside of the United States for U.S.
individuals using U.S.-based websites).
224 Swire, Hemmings & Vergnolle, supra note 1 (manuscript at 38–39).
225 The lack of surveillance safeguards in Russia has been documented in detail by the European Court of
Human Rights in the 2015 Zakharov case. See Zakharov v. Russia, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. 69 (2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-159324"]}; see also James Slater, As Russia Insulates Itself from
Human Rights Bodies, State Surveillance Decision Looms, GLOBALVOICES (Dec. 17, 2015, 11:03 PM), https://
advox.globalvoices.org/2015/12/18/as-russia-insulates-itself-from-human-rights-bodies-state-surveillancedecision-looms/; Andrei Soldatov & Irina Borogan, Russia’s Surveillance State, WORLD POLICY INST.,
http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/fall2013/Russia-surveillance (last visited Nov. 10, 2016); Pierluigi
Paganini, New Powers for the Russian Surveillance System SORM-2, SECURITY AFFAIRS (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/27611/digital-id/new-powers-sorm-2.html; PRIVACY INT’L, PRIVACY
INTERESTS: MONITORING CENTRAL ASIA (Nov. 2014), https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/
Private%20Interests%20with%20annex_0.pdf.
226 REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 215; Neha Mishra, Data Localization Laws in a Digital
World: Data Protection or Data Protectionism?, PUBLIC SPHERE, 2016, at 135, 139; Alexander Plaum, The
Impact of Forced Data Localisation on Fundamental Rights, ACCESS NOW (June 4, 2014),
https://www.accessnow.org/the-impact-of-forced-data-localisation-on-fundamental-rights/.
227 See REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 42, at 214–16.
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unilateral—the country seeking the records decides what level of legal process
and privacy protection to offer. Compared to the MLA status quo, that means
that requests made to U.S.-based companies will no longer have to meet the
current Fourth Amendment and ECPA requirements. More generally,
widespread use of extra-territoriality leads to a “race to the bottom” for privacy,
where the country with the fewest legal protections gains easiest access to the
evidence.228 Compared to the MLA status quo, where U.S. legal protections help
set a global norm for when access is appropriate, widespread extra-territoriality
would undermine the ability of the United States and other rule-of-law nations
to set international norms for privacy and civil liberties protections.
Supporting the MLA status quo thus quite likely leads to a degradation of
privacy protections, as countries gain access to evidence by a combination of
data localization and extra-territoriality measures.
The disadvantages of the MLA status quo, along with the advantages to
legitimate law enforcement access from a streamlined process, have led the
United States to support revisions to MLA, notably through the VWP model. As
we began advocating to the U.S. government and other stakeholders in early
2015,229 we support amending ECPA to allow streamlined access where the
requesting country agrees to a series of effective privacy and civil liberties
safeguards. The proposed U.S./U.K. MLA Agreement contains many of the
types of safeguards we have discussed previously in writing and in stakeholder
meetings, although we have reservations about some items, such as whether a
foreign government can constitutionally intercept real-time communications in
the United States without U.S. judicial oversight.230
228 Companies can avoid doing business entirely in a jurisdiction if the legal regime there becomes too
objectionable. The possibility of companies doing so provides some constraint on a country’s decision to demand
access to records, especially for smaller markets where a global company can more readily decide to abstain
from doing business. For larger markets, companies face a bigger loss if they decide to avoid the jurisdiction
entirely.
229 We set forth the argument for the VWP analogy in a series of conferences in the first half of 2015, at
NYU Law School, the Privacy Law Scholars Conference, and the Berkman Center of Harvard Law School.
230 As discussed in Part III, the U.S. courts have historically required more than a probable cause showing
for real-time wiretaps, and have also applied Fourth Amendment constitutional protections to wiretaps that take
place on U.S. territory. The proposed U.S./U.K. agreement, by contrast, would enable U.K. access not only to
stored communications (where we support streamlined access), but also to real-time interceptions. We believe
there is a strong likelihood that U.S. courts would find real-time interceptions by a government, carried out in
the United States to be protected by the Fourth Amendment and thus not authorized by the U.S./U.K. agreement.
Professors Daskal and Woods have argued that the stricter protections for real-time interceptions are no longer
justified due to changing technology. See Jennifer Daskal & Andrew Keane Woods, Congress Should Embrace
the DOJ’s Cross-Border Data Fix, JUST SECURITY BLOG (Aug. 1, 2016, 8:03 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/
32213/congress-embrace-dojs-cross-border-data-fix/; see also Jennifer Daskal, A New UK-US Data Sharing
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Not only do we believe that the VWP model offers better privacy protections,
but there is considerable urgency to making progress on such reform. If reform
is delayed for a considerable period, then countries seeking records will have the
time and incentive to pass sweeping data localization and extra-territoriality
laws.231 Once those laws are in place, those countries have far less reason to
agree to U.S.-style safeguards to gain access to the records held by U.S.-based
companies. Today, by contrast, the leverage of the United States for strong
privacy protections is at its peak—many of the most valuable sources of
evidence are held by U.S.-based companies, and those companies today operate
under the strict U.S. regime for government access to data.
In short, the VWP model offers the best current approach to achieve all the
major public policy goals. For privacy, it avoids a slippery slope into localization
and extra-territoriality. For legitimate law enforcement requests, the streamlined
process offers access to evidence under workable and timely procedures for
many such requests (while keeping current safeguards where adequate
safeguards are lacking). For a well-functioning Internet, the approach dissipates
pressure for localization and extra-territoriality.
Similarly, if well crafted, the VWP model offers the best current approach
for all the major stakeholders. For privacy supporters, we have explained reasons
to believe that the VWP model offers the best long-term protections, even
though it may mean compromise on some of the specific safeguards cherished
by privacy supporters, such as a U.S.-style probable cause requirement. For the
technology companies, the VWP approach offers a rule-of-law structure that
enables response to legitimate requests, protection of customer data from
illegitimate requests, and protection against pressure from extra-territorial
requests. For non-U.S. governments, streamlined access responds to their
diminishing access to important evidence. For the U.S. government, the DOJ has
a new incentive to support MLA and ECPA reform in the wake of Microsoft

Agreement: A Tremendous Opportunity, If Done Right, JUST SECURITY BLOG (Feb. 8, 2016, 8:10 AM),
https://www.
justsecurity.org/29203/british-searches-america-tremendoUS-opportunity/. It is a complex topic to consider how
the U.S. courts in the future could analyze the relative sensitivity of stored records and real-time intercepts.
Removing the stronger protections for real-time intercepts, however, would be a momentous change in landmark
privacy protections offered by Katz and Berger, so as matter of predicting U.S. courts’ views, we believe that
warrantless real-time wiretaps in the United States would quite likely be struck down as unconstitutional.
231 There are other reasons that countries may pass data localization laws. See REVIEW GROUP REPORT,
supra note 42, at 214–16. Our point is that lack of law enforcement to evidence of local crimes can be a
significant additional factor leading to support of data localization laws.
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Ireland. The VWP approach to reform thus can gain support from a potentially
powerful coalition of privacy supporters, technology companies, and the DOJ.
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated important ways that both the EU and the
United States are stricter when it comes to privacy protections for government
access to data. At a descriptive level, the relative strictness of both sides is
important to debates about whether the United States has adequate privacy
protection, and thus should be a lawful destination for flows of personal data
from the EU. Since the Snowden leaks began in 2013, many EU discussions of
U.S. privacy protections have underestimated the number and vigor of U.S.
protections, notably against excessive government surveillance. The United
States has more than two centuries of experience with an independent judiciary
applying effective limits on government surveillance. For criminal
investigations, the Fourth Amendment and ECPA are stricter than the standards
for government access in much of the EU. For foreign intelligence surveillance,
an international team of experts found that U.S. law “contains much clearer rules
on the authorisation and limits on the collection, use, sharing, and oversight of
data relating to foreign nationals than the equivalent laws of almost all EU
Member States.”232
The relative strictness of U.S. criminal law is also important to our ongoing
research project on MLA in an era of globalized communications. This Article
has explored the understandable reasons why privacy supporters in both the
United States and EU have been reluctant in MLA reform debates to agree to
compromises on specific privacy safeguards. With that said, our analysis
supports the VWP model as the best hope for long-term privacy protection, as
well as the best approach for fulfilling legitimate law enforcement requests,
providing a workable regime for information technology companies, and
preserving a well-functioning Internet against balkanization and localization
rules. In short, we conclude with words from a 2016 essay by Ian Brown of
Oxford, Vivek Krishnamurthy of Harvard, and Swire:
US efforts to reform MLATs must occur in tandem with reform efforts
in Europe and globally. There must be genuine appreciation that other
democratic nations differ in the details of their systems, while seeking
essentially the same goals. When discussing global communications,
232 Ian Brown et al., Towards Multilateral Standards for Foreign Surveillance 3 (Oxford Internet Discussion
Paper, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2551164.
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the debate in the US should not be US-centric, just as the debate in the
rest of the world must not be reflexively anti-American. We need much
more robust engagement with civil society and experts from many
nations. Only then can reform be achieved in ways that return the
“mutual” to Mutual Legal Assistance.233
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Brown, Krishnamurthy & Swire, supra note 204.
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